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Abstract: Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minori-
ties, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) pro-
mote consensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour
the status quo or rely too much on chance?
We show the answer is yes by describing two nondeterministic voting meth-
ods, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional
commitments to approve compromise options. Our theoretical analysis and
agent-based simulation experiments suggest that with these, majorities cannot
consistently suppress minorities as with deterministic methods, proponents of
the status quo cannot block decisions as in consensus-based approaches, the
resulting aggregate welfare is comparable to existing methods, and average
randomness is lower than for other nondeterministic methods.
Majority rule, considered a cornerstone of democracy, allows the oppression of minorities —
Tocqueville’s ‘tyranny of the majority’ (1) — which may lead to separatism or violent conflict
(2, 3). One way to address this is the fundamental fairness principle of proportionality (e.g.,
(3, 4)). But if proportionality is only used to elect a representative body that then uses majority
voting after all, the problem remains (5). Why? Proportional representation does not imply
proportional power: even a 49 percent faction may not be able to influence any decision. For
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example, given the strong polarization in the US Senate (6), the Democratic Party currently
appears to have zero effective power in it, according to the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power
indices (7). But can power be distributed proportionally at all?
Smaller groups often try to overcome the problem by seeking consensus, but that is difficult
in strategic contexts (8). Status quo supporters may block consensus indefinitely, or, if the
fallback is majority voting, a majority can simply wait for that to be invoked. Hence common
consensus procedures are either not neutral about the options or effectively majoritarian like
most common voting methods if voters act strategically.
Judging from social choice theory, the formal science of group decision making, such non-
proportional effective power distribution seems unavoidable (9), whether in a political or every-
day context. But this is only so if the employed decision methods are required to be essentially
deterministic, only using chance to resolve ties. In fact, nondeterministic methods cannot only
distribute power proportionally, which is obvious, but at the same time support consensus and
thus lead to efficient outcomes (10).
It may seem outlandish to use a decision method that employs chance on a regular basis,
producing uncertain outcomes. But real-world problems typically involve quite some unavoid-
able stochastic risk and other forms of uncertainty anyway, e.g., due to lacking information,
complexity, or dependence on others (11). Also, routine use of nondeterministic procedures in
contexts such as learning (12), optimization (13), strategic interactions (14), or the allocation of
indivisible resources as in school choice (15) shows that using chance can be quite beneficial,
efficient, and acceptable. Those examples also demonstrate that carefully using chance must
not be confused with outright randomness.
In this article, we adopt the working hypothesis that at least in everyday situations in which
people often say “let’s have a vote”, many groups might try a nondeterministic voting method
if that has clear advantages. For such situations, we study two such methods, one of which
is novel, that achieve fairness by distributing power proportionally and increase efficiency by
supporting not just full but also partial consensus and compromise.
As an illustrative test case (Fig. 1), consider a group of three factions F1, F2, F3 with sizes
S 1,2,3 (in percent), each of which has a favourite option, X1,2,3, not liked by the other two
factions, respectively. Assume there is a fourth option A not liked by F3 but liked by F1,2
almost as much as X1,2. We call A a potential ‘partial consensus’ for F1,2 together. While
efficiency requires that A gets a good chance of winning, proportionality requires that also X3
gets some chance of winning. Accordingly, our methods will assign winning probabilities of
S 1 + S 2 % to A and S 3 % to X3, even if voters vote strategically. If we add a fifth option B
which F1,2 like slightly less than A, and which F3 likes almost as much as X3, both our methods
will pick this potential ‘full consensus’ B for sure. In contrast, if S 1 > S 2 + S 3 and voters act
strategically, virtually all existing voting methods will either pick X1 with certainty, or will
assign probabilities of S 1,2,3 % to X1,2,3, in both cases ignoring A (and B) and thus producing
much less overall welfare. No deterministic voting method can let F1,2 together make sure that
A gets a chance without allowing them to render F3’s votes completely irrelevant. This can only
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Figure 1: Archetypical group decision problem with potential for suppression of minorities, partial,
or full consensus. Each of three factions of different size (column width) has a unique favourite (top-
most). There might also be a potential ‘partial consensus’ option A and/or a potential ‘full consensus’
B. With strategic voters, common deterministic methods pick X1 for sure. Our methods Nash Lottery
and MaxParC pick B for sure if present (green); they pick one of X1,2,3 with probabilities (colored area)
proportional to faction size if neither A nor B is present (orange); and they pick A or X3 with proportional
probabilities if A but not B is present (blue).
be achieved by employing a judicious amount of chance.
But how exactly? How to design a nondeterministic voting method that is both efficient
and proportional, even when voters act strategically, and also fulfills other basic consistency re-
quirements like those typically studied in social choice theory — such as anonymity, neutrality,
monotonicity, and clone-proofness — that make it plausible and hard to manipulate?
Our first method, the Nash Lottery (NL), is basically what is known as ‘Nash Max Product’
or ‘Maximum Nash Welfare’ in the literature on fair division of resources. As suggested in (16),
we translate it to our voting context by interpreting winning probability as a “resource” to be
divided fairly, and study the strategic implications of this. NL can be interpreted as a form
of automatic bargaining by means of the Nash bargaining solution. Similar to score-based
methods such as Range Voting (RV) (17), it asks each voter, i, to give a rating, rix ≥ 0, for
each option x. It then assigns winning probabilities, px, that maximize a certain function,
f (r, p). RV maximizes f (r, p) =
∑
i
∑
x rix px, resulting in a very efficient majoritarian method
that is deterministic (usually px = 1 for some x) but neither distributes power proportionally nor
supports consensus when voters are strategic. NL instead maximizes
f (r, p) =
∑
i
log
∑
x
rix px
 , (1)
resulting in a nondeterministic method that supports both full and partial consensus. In the
Supplementary Text, we prove that in situations similar to Fig. 1, a full consensus will be the
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Figure 2: Voting method MaxParC from the view of some voter Alice (left). Rating 13 for option C
is interpreted as saying that Alice approves of C if less than 13 percent of voters do not approve of C.
Resulting approval scores can be found graphically in a way similar to ref. (18) (right).
sure winner, and that using the logarithm rather than any other function of
∑
x rix px is the unique
way to achieve a proportional power distribution.
NL is conceptually simple and has some other desirable properties shown in Fig. 3 such
as being immune to certain manipulations, e.g., cloning options or adding bad options. But
it has three important drawbacks. Its tallying procedure is intransparent, requiring numerical
optimization. It lacks certain intuitive ‘monotonicity’ properties: when a new option is added
or a voter increases some existing option’s rating, some other option’s winning probability may
increase rather than decrease. And NL often employs much more randomness than necessary.
All three drawbacks are overcome by our second method, the novel Maximal Partial Con-
sensus (MaxParC), which is conceptually more complex, but strongly monotonic, much easier
to tally, and produces less entropy. Based on the idea of conditional commitments, it lets each
voter safely transfer “their” share of the winning probability to potential consensus options if
enough other voters do so as well. That is done in a way inspired by Granovetter’s famous
‘threshold model’ (18, 19). Again, voters assign numerical ratings, 0 ≤ rix ≤ 100. This is in-
terpreted as a ‘willingness to approve’, stating that “i will approve of x if strictly less than rix
percent of all voters do not approve of x.” To solve this recursive definition of ‘approval’ for any
given option x, MaxParC sorts the ballots ascendingly w.r.t. their rating of option x, then finds
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Figure 3: Properties of common group decision methods, Nash Lottery, and MaxParC. Solid and dashed
diamonds indicate full and partial fulfillment, numbers are qualitative complexity assessments by the
authors, color only distinguishes different groups of criteria (see Supplementary Text details and proofs).
the first ballot i in this ordering such that strictly less than rix percent of the ballots precede it
(i.e., have r jx < rix). This ballot i and all later ballots j (those with r jx ≥ the cutoff rix) are said
to approve of x. After thus determining which ballots approve which options, MaxParC then
proceeds like the ‘Conditional Utilitarian Rule’ from (16, 20): one ballot is drawn at random,
and from the options approved by this ballot, that with the largest overall approval wins. If
one compromise option is rated positive by everyone, it will win for sure. Fig. 2 illustrates the
MaxParC procedure.
Fig. 3 summarizes our theoretical analysis of the formal properties of NL and MaxParC as
compared to typical voting methods from the literature, validating that the latter perform well
in terms of these qualitative criteria.
To assess the potential costs of achieving fairness and supporting consensus in more quanti-
tative terms of welfare, voter satisfaction, and entropy, we finally performed a large agent-based
simulation experiment. In over 2.5 million hypothetical group decision problems, we compared
NL and MaxParC’s performance to that of five deterministic majoritarian and three nonde-
terministic proportional methods: Plurality Voting (PV), Approval Voting (AV), RV, Instant-
Runoff Voting (IRV), Simpson–Kramer (a simple Condorcet method, SC); ‘Random Ballot’
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(RB), and two methods from (10) (FC and RFC). To generate the decision problems, we used
random combinations of the number and compromise potential of options and the number, in-
dividual preference distributions, and risk-attitudes of voters. For each combination of decision
problem and voting method, we simulated several opinion polls, a main voting round, and an
interactive phase where ballots could be modified continuously for strategic reasons. In this,
we assumed various mixtures of behavioural types of voters: lazy voting, sincere voting, indi-
vidual heuristics, trial and error, and coordinated strategic voting. For each decision problem,
we computed several metrics of social welfare, randomness, and voter satisfaction for all voting
methods, and which voters would prefer which voting methods (see Materials and Methods for
details).
As can be expected, typically a majority of the simulated voters preferred the results of
the majoritarian methods over those of the proportional ones. On average, voters preferred
MaxParC over the other proportional methods; among the majoritarian methods, there was
no predominant preference. Individual voters’ satisfaction, normalized to zero for their least-
preferred option and one for their favourite, averaged around 67 % for PV, AV, RV, and IRV;
61 % for SC, NL, MaxParC; and still 57 % for RB, FC, RFC.
MaxParC produced about 60 % of the entropy of RB, NL about 80 %. In MaxParC, the
largest winning probability was about 65 % on average, in NL only about 53 %.
The deterministic methods produced somewhat higher welfare on average, but for some
preference models and welfare metrics, the nondeterministic methods matched or outperformed
them (Fig. 4). In more than 75 % of cases, the utility difference between the average and the
worst-off voter under RV was at least seven times the difference in average voter utility be-
tween RV and MaxParC. This can be interpreted as saying that the welfare costs of fairness and
consensus are small compared to the inequality costs of majoritarianism.
On most results, preference distributions had a larger effect than behavioural type or the
amount of interaction. Surprisingly, strategic voters gained no clear advantage over lazy voters,
and also risk-attitudes played a minor role.
In 2007, one of us (Heitzig) asked the election methods electronic mailing list (21) what method
would elect the compromise rather than the majority option in a situation similar to Fig. 1, even
when voters acted strategically. Soon it became obvious that no deterministic method would do,
but several lottery methods were quickly found that elected the compromise with certainty. So
why do election methods experts show little enthusiasm for nondeterministic methods? Perhaps
because their primary interest is in periodic high-stakes public elections every several years. The
proportional fairness of lottery methods is due to their average proportionality over many indi-
vidual decisions. Few would suggest deciding which of two newlyweds shall be the households
dictator by flipping a coin. Using coin flips for their many everyday decisions would be better
— because stakes are lower and advantages level out over time — but would still not lead to
a single consensus. Using the two methods presented here would likely make them agree on
some compromise in most situations and toss a coin only rarely. Both the splitting-up into many
decisions and the incentives for agreement lower the resulting overall entropy.
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Figure 4: Distribution of final Gini-Sen welfare across 2.5 mio. agent-based simulations by voting
method (rows), for five different models of how voter preferences might be distributed (columns). See
Supplementary Text for definitions and more results.
While this seems to imply that such consensus-supporting proportional methods are best
used for everyday decisions only, they might even be applied to larger decisions such as allocat-
ing some budget or electing a parliament. This is because the asset distributed by these methods
need not be ‘winning probability’ in a single-outcome decision as in this article. For example,
suppose NL or MaxParC instead of one of the common simple proportional methods was used
for allocating parliamentary seats to party lists, based on voters’ ratings of all parties. Would not
this method take better advantage of opportunities for consensus without sacrificing proportion-
ality? Since the seat distribution would on average have a lower entropy than usual, would it not
avoid unnecessary balkanization or fragmentation of parliament without sacrificing representa-
tion of minorities? We hope that this discussion serves to stimulate the reader’s imagination to
some of the possibilities of application, as well as avenues for further exploration.
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1 Materials and Methods
1.1 Summary
1.1.1 Context
A finite group of voters must collectively pick exactly one winning option out of a given fi-
nite number of options of any kind (e.g., certain kinds of objects, places, time-points, actions,
strategies, people, etc.). The menu of options is already given at the beginning of the situation
we consider, and all options are mutually exclusive and feasible, i.e., each one could be imple-
mented without violating any relevant constraint (e.g., budgets, applicable laws, basic rights,
time constraints etc.). Although in the real world, the option menu might sometimes change
during a group decision procedure, we consider the composition of the option menu as a sep-
arate process here which has been completed before the situation we consider. We assume the
voters will apply some formalized method to pick one option that may be described as some
form of protocol or game form which requires the voters to provide some kind of information in
a step we term voting and then determines a winning option from this information in a step we
term tallying, using some kind of algorithm that may or may not involve some form of random-
ization. We call the information a voter provides this voter’s ballot and the method that turns
sets of ballots into winning options a voting method.
In addition, we assume each voters possesses some form of preferences regarding the op-
tions and regarding possible probability distributions of options. Again, even though in the real
world, preferences might sometimes change during a group decision procedure, in particular in
certain forms of deliberation or consensus finding, we consider here also the formation of pref-
erences as a separate process which has been completed before the voting. This assumption is
in line with the established approach taken in social choice theory. We do not, however, assume
that there is a simple deterministic relationship between voters’ preferences and their ballots,
but rather assume that voters may use different kinds of heuristics or strategies to decide how to
fill in their ballots.
1.1.2 Problem statement
In this context, we aim at finding a voting method that fulfills certain consistency, fairness, and
efficiency criteria as stated in the main text and detailed further in Section 2 of this document.
1.1.3 Transdisciplinary methodological approach
To this end, we study the qualitative and quantitative properties of different voting methods,
some well-known from the social choice literature, one adapted from the theory of fair budget
allocation, and one designed newly. To study the qualitative properties of voting methods, we
apply a mixture of methods from social choice theory and game theory. For the quantitative
properties we apply large-scale (Monte-Carlo) numerical simulations of an agent-based model
12
whose assumptions are partially based on the spatial theory of voting from political science and
on insights from the study of risk attitudes and bounded rationality in behavioural economics.
We analyze simulation results by means of metrics adapted from welfare economics and infor-
mation theory.
Note on terminology. Because we assume preferences have been determined before voting,
we do not in this study distinguish linguistically between the terms ‘consensus’, ‘consent’, and
‘compromise’, but rather use a very pragmatic working definition of potential consensus here.
In this study, consensus does not mean that all voters consider the exact same option from the
option menu their favourite option. Informally, we rather say there is (full or partial) potential
consensus whenever there is some option which (all or some group of) voters would prefer to
having one randomly drawn voter make the choice.
1.2 Ballot types and voting methods
In this section we introduce a formal mathematical framework for comparing quite different
voting methods and then use it to define our versions of a number of common group decision
methods, at which point the motivations for the various abstract notions should become clear.
We assume an infinite universe of potential voters I and an infinite universe of potential
options X, leading to a universe of potential finite electorates E = {E ⊂ I : 1 ≤ |E| <∞} and a
universe of potential finite choice sets C = {C ⊂ X : 1 ≤ |C| <∞}. For each choice set C ∈ C, let
L(C) = {` ∈ [0,1]C : ∑x∈C `(x) = 1} be the set of all lotteries on C, and let `x ∈ L(C) with `x(x) = 1
be the sure-thing lottery that picks x ∈ C for sure. In most of what follows we deal with fixed
sets E and C and denote their sizes by N and k, but for some proofs we have to consider all of
E and C.
1.2.1 Ballot types
Since we will deal with voting methods using quite different types of ballots, some only letting
the voter mark a single option, others many, still others requiring a strict ranking or asking for
quantitative ratings or the like, we need a formal framework general enough to cover all relevant
cases and make them comparable in those respects important for the assessment of the method’s
properties. In particular, we need to make clear for each ballot type what it means when we say
that a ballot states a preference for one option over another or a ballot results from another ballot
by advancing an option to a certain degree. The following abstract definition will prove useful
in these tasks:
A ballot type is a tuple (B,P,Q) with the following properties:
• B is a function such that for all choice sets C ∈ C, B(C) is a nonempty set representing
the different ways b in which a voter might fill in a ballot for the choice set C, and
B(C)∩B(C′) = ∅ if C ,C′.
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• P is a function such that for all C ∈ C and all filled-in ballots b ∈ B(C), Pb is a strict partial
ordering relation on C (i.e., irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive, but not necessarily
complete) representing that part of ballot b that will be interpreted as stated preferences,
with x Pb y meaning that x is put in a strictly “better place” (ranking, rating, threshold,
etc.) on b than y is.
• Q is a function such that for all C ∈ C and all options x ∈C, QCx is a strict partial ordering
relation on B(C) with b QCx b
′ meaning that the two filled-in ballots b,b′ ∈ B(C) only differ
in the fact that b puts x in a strictly “better place” than b′ while each other option is treated
the same on b and b′, so that b can be seen as resulting from b′ by “advancing” x in some
way and changing nothing else.
Note that Pb = Pb′ does not imply b = b′ in general since some ballot types (e.g., ratings
ballots) also contain other information than just a binary preference relation.
If C ∈ C, b ∈ B(C), and x Pb y for all y ∈C \ {x}, we call x the stated favourite on b and write
F(b) = x. Since Pb may be incomplete but is asymmetric, a ballot contains either no stated
favourite (in which case we write F(b) = ∅) or exactly one. If F(b) = x and ¬y Pb z for any
y,z , x, we say that b is a bullet vote for x.
1.2.2 Ballot profiles and voting methods.
A ballot profile of type (B,P,Q) for electorate E ∈ E and choice set C ∈ C is a function β : E→
B(C) specifying a filled-in ballot βi for each voter i ∈ E.
A (potentially probabilistic) voting method is a tuple (B,P,Q,M) such that (B,P,Q) is a
ballot type and M is a function such that for all E ∈ E and C ∈ C, and all ballot profiles β of
type (B,P,Q) for E and C, it specifies a winning lottery M(β) ∈ L(C). Of course, M(β) may be
a sure-thing lottery with M(β)x = 1 for some x ∈C.
Plurality Voting (PV). We formalize the ballot type of Plurality Ballot as follows:
• B(C) = C, i.e., each voter has to vote for exactly one option x ∈C by putting b = x.
• x Pb y iff b = x , y, i.e., voting for x is interpreted as stating a strict preference for x over
all other options.
• b QCx b′ iff b = x , b′, i.e., “advancing” x means converting a vote for a different option
into a vote for x.
Using this ballot type, the voting method of Plurality Voting now puts M(β)x = 1A(x)/|A|,
where 1A is the indicator function of the set A = {x : p(x) ≥ p(y) for all y ∈ C} of plurality
winners, and p(x) = |{i ∈ E : βi = x}| is x’s plurality score.
Note that for simplicity, in our version one cannot abstain under plurality voting, and hence
every ballot is a bullet vote. Generally |A| = 1 except for ties, which means that this is a “deter-
ministic” method in our terminology.
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Approval Voting (AV). We formalize the ballot type of Approval Ballot as follows:
• B(C) = {0,1}C , i.e., each voter can either approve (by putting b(x) = 1) or disapprove (by
putting b(x) = 0) of each option x ∈C individually.
• x Pb y iff b(x) > b(y), i.e., iff b(x) = 1 and b(y) = 0, meaning that approving x is interpreted
as stating a strict preference for x over all non-approved options.
• b QCx b′ iff b(x) > b′(x) and b(y) = b′(y) for all y ∈ C \ {x}, i.e., “advancing” x means con-
verting a non-approval of x into an approval of x.
Using this ballot type, the voting method of Approval Voting now puts M(β)x = 1A(x)/|A|, where
1A is the indicator function of the set A = {x : a(x) ≥ a(y) for all y ∈C} of approval winners and
a(x) =
∑
i∈E βi(x) is x’s approval score.
There are two equivalent ways to “abstain” under approval voting: putting b(x) ≡ 0 for all
x ∈ C or putting b(x) ≡ 1 for all x ∈ C. Bullet voting for x means putting b(x) = 1 and b(y) = 0
for all other y.
Range Voting (RV). In our version of range voting, the ballot type of Range Ballot has:
• B(C) = [0,100]C , i.e., one can assign any real-valued rating 0 ≤ b(x) ≤ 100 to each option
x ∈C individually.1
• x Pb y iff b(x) > b(y) as before, meaning that a higher rating states a strict preference.
• b QCx b′ iff b(x) > b′(x) and b(y) = b′(y) for all y ∈C \{x}, i.e., “advancing” x means raising
its rating.
Using this ballot type, the voting method of Range Voting puts M(β)x = 1R(x)/|R|, where 1R
is the indicator function of the set R = {x : r(x) ≥ r(y) for all y ∈ C} of range winners and
r(x) =
∑
i∈E βi(x) is x’s range score.
There are infinitely many equivalent ways to “abstain” under range voting: choose some
α ∈ [0,100] and put b(x) ≡ α for all x ∈ C. There are also infinitely many ways to “bullet vote”
for x under range voting, and they are not (!) equivalent: choose 0 ≤ α < γ ≤ 100 and put
b(x) = γ and b(y) = α for all other y ∈C.
In addition to the above three “scoring methods”, we consider the following two more compli-
cated “ranking methods”.
1Voter i’s choice of b(x) is what was denoted rix in the main text.
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Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV). In our version of instant-runoff voting, we use the following
ballot type of Truncated Ranking Ballot:
• B(C) =
{
b ∈ (N∪{∞})C : b[b−1[N]] = {1, . . . , |b−1[N]|}
}
. In other words, one has to assign
consecutive and distinct integer ranks 1,2, . . . to any empty or nonempty subset of the
options, leaving the other options unranked (here formally encoded by “rank”∞).
• x Pb y iff b(x) < b(y) (!) since a smaller rank number indicates a “better place”.
• b QCx b′ iff Pb|C\{x} = Pb′ |C\{x},2 x Pb y whenever x Pb′ y, y Pb′ x whenever y Pb x, but Pb ,
Pb′ . In other words, advancing x means changing the ranks so that the resulting ordering
P doesn’t change except that some options ranked better than x before are now either
ranked lower than x or not ranked at all, and/or x was not ranked before and is now
ranked better than at least one option.
Using this ballot type, our simple version of the voting method of Instant-Runoff Voting (aka
Single Transferable Vote, or Alternative Vote) runs like this: Initialize D = C and repeat the
following as long as |D| > 1: For each option x ∈ D, calculate the score s(x) =
∣∣∣∣{i ∈ E : βi(x) <
βi(y) for all y ∈ D \ {x}
}∣∣∣∣. From the set of worst-scored options, W = {x ∈ D : s(x) ≤ s(y) for all
y ∈ D}, draw a random member and remove it from D. The remaining member of D wins.
Abstention means not ranking any option (i.e., putting bx =∞ for all x). A bullet vote ranks
exactly one option (i.e., puts bx = 1 for some x and by =∞ for all other y).
Simple Condorcet (SC). In our version of the Simple Condorcet method, we use the follow-
ing ballot type of Weak Ranking Ballot:
• B(C) = (N∪ {∞})C . In other words, one can assign arbitrary integer ranks 1,2, . . . to
any empty or nonempty subset of the options, leaving the other options unranked (again
encoded by∞).
• x Pb y iff b(x) < b(y) as in IRV.
• b QCx b′ iff Pb|C\{x} = Pb′ |C\{x}, x Pb y whenever x Pb′ y, y Pb′ x whenever y Pb x, but Pb ,
Pb′ . In other words, advancing x means changing the ranks so that the resulting ordering
P doesn’t change except that some options ranked better than x before are now either
ranked equal to or lower than x or not ranked at all, and/or some options ranked equal to
x before are now ranked lower than x or not ranked at all,
Note that we allow both that some options are ranked equal and some rank numbers are skipped
since the only information our version of the Simple Condorcet method (aka the Minimax Con-
dorcet or Simpson–Kramer method with pairwise opposition as score) is the ordering Pb. We
2If R ⊆ X × X is a binary relation on some set X and S ⊆ X is a subset of X, then R|S = R∩ (S × S ) is the
restriction of R to S .
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put M(β)x = 1O(x)/|O|, where 1O is the indicator function of the set O = {x : o(x) ≤ o(y) for
all y ∈ C} of weak condorcet winners, o(x) = maxy∈C o(x,y) is x’s worst opposition value, and
o(x,y) = |{i ∈ E : y Pβi x}| for all x,y ∈C.
There are infinitely many equivalent ways to “abstain” under the Simple Condorcet method:
choose some α ∈N∪{∞} and put b(x) ≡ α for all x ∈C. The most straightforward is to not rank
any option at all. There are also infinitely many equivalent ways to “bullet vote” for x under the
Simple Condorcet method: choose ∞ ≥ α > γ ∈ N and put b(x) = γ and b(y) = α for all other
y ∈C.
After these five “deterministic” methods, we now turn to five “non-deterministic” methods,
beginning with three from the literature.
Random Ballot (RB). The Random Ballot (aka Random Dictator) method uses Plurality Bal-
lots but puts M(β)x = p(x)/N. The interpretation is that one ballot is drawn uniformly at random
to decide.
Full Consensus / Random Ballot (FC). An FC Ballot is basically a combination of two
Plurality Ballots:
• B(C) = C ×C, i.e., each voter specifies one “proposed consensus” b1 ∈ C and one “fall-
back” option b2 ∈C.
• x Pb y iff b2 = x , y, i.e., only the fall-back part of the ballot is interpreted as stating a
strict preference for b2 over all other options, while the consensus part is interpreted as
inherently strategic.
• b QCx b′ iff b , b′ and (b1 = x , b′1 or b1 = b′1) and (b2 = x , b′2 or b2 = b′2), i.e., “ad-
vancing” x means advancing it in at least one of the two ballot parts.
The method of Full Consensus / Random Ballot (FC) is now defined as in (10) (there called
“Voting method 1”): M(β)x = 1 if β1i = x for all i ∈ E; otherwise M(β)x = p2(x)/N for all x ∈ C
(“fall-back lottery”), where p2(x) = |{i ∈ E : β2i = x}| is x’s fall-back score. The interpretation is
that if all voters propose the same consensus, that option wins, otherwise the fall-back lottery
applies.
A bullet vote is a bullet vote on both ballot parts. There is no way to abstain.
Full Consensus / Random Ballot / Ratings (RFC). Similarly, an RFC Ballot is a combina-
tion of two Plurality Ballots and a Range Ballot:
• B(C) = C ×C × [0,100]C , i.e., each voter specifies one proposed consensus b1 ∈ C, one
fall-back option b2 ∈C, and a vector of ratings b3(x) ∈ [0,100] for all x ∈C.
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• x Pb y iff b3(x) > b3(y), i.e., only the ratings part of the ballot is interpreted as stating
preferences, while the other two parts are interpreted as inherently strategic.
• b QCx b′ iff b , b′ and (b1 = x , b′1 or b1 = b′1) and (b2 = x , b′2 or b2 = b′2) and b3(x) ≥
b3(y), i.e., “advancing” x means advancing it in at least one of the three ballot parts.
The method of Full Consensus / Random Ballot / Ratings (RFC) is also defined as in (10) (there
called “Voting method 2”). For all j ∈ E, let r j = ∑y∈C p2(y)β3j(y)/N be the rating of the fall-back
lottery by voter j. Then put M(β)x =
|Ax|
N + (1− |A|N ) p2(x)N , where Ax is the set of all i ∈ E for which
β1i = x and β
3
j(x) ≥ r j for all j ∈ E (i.e., whose proposed consensus is x and is preferred to the
fall-back lottery by all voters according to their ratings), and A =
⋃
y∈C Ay. The interpretation
is that a voter i is drawn uniformly at random, and if i’s proposed consensus β1i is unanimously
preferred to the fall-back lottery p2(x)/N, it wins, otherwise the fall-back lottery is applied.
A bullet vote is a bullet vote on all three ballot parts. There is no way to abstain.
Nash Lottery (NL). The Nash Lottery method uses Range Ballots. Given β, i ∈ E, and ` ∈
L(C), let ri(`) =
∑
x∈C `(x)βi(x) and S (`) = −∑i∈E logri(`). If there is a unique ` ∈ L(C) with
S (`) > S (`′) for all `′ ∈ L(C) \ {`}, we put M(β) = `. In the rare cases where argmax`∈L(C) S (`)
is not a singleton, we use that ` which our numerical optimizer (the minimize function from
the scipy.optimize Python package with method ‘SLSQP’) returns.
For formal theoretical analyses, one can use the following tie-breaker instead. Put rki =∑
x `(x)
k
√
βi(x) for all k = 1,2,3, . . . , and S k(`) =
∑
i logrki (`) ∈ [−∞,∞). Note that all S k are
continuous, continuously differentiable, and weakly concave functions of `. Hence S 1 has a
global maximum that is attained on a non-empty compact convex set T 1 ⊆ L(C), and for all
k ≥ 2, S k restricted to T k−1 has a global maximum that is attained on a non-empty compact
convex set T k ⊆ T k−1. Then also T = ⋂∞k=1 T k is non-empty compact convex, hence Lebesgue-
measurable, and hence has a well-defined unique centre of mass ` =
∫
T `d`/
∫
T d` with ` ∈ T
because of the convexity. We now put M(β) = `. The rationale for using concave functions of
ratings to break ties is that in this way lotteries with lower entropy are preferred. The rationale
for using the k-th square roots for this task is that in this way the tie-breaking is complete except
in the case of clones (see below).
A bullet vote is to rate one option at > 0 and all others at 0, abstention means rating all
options at the same value > 0.
In the context of “dichotomous preferences”, a similar method based on Approval Ballots
was studied in (16) under the name “Nash Max Product”. The same idea is also common in the
literature on fair division (22).
Maximal Partial Consensus (MaxParC, MPC). For our simulations, we use this version of
MaxParC ballots:
• B(C) = [0,100]C , i.e., one can assign any real-valued willingness to approve 0 ≤ b(x) ≤
100 to each option x ∈C individually.
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• x Pb y iff b(x) = 100 > b(y) or b(x) > 0 = b(y), i.e., we only interpret the special values
100 and 0 as “stated preferences” and treat all intermediate values as inherently strategic
since their interpretation relates to other voters’ willingnesses.
• b QCx b′ iff b(x) > b′(x) and b(y) = b′(y) for all y ∈C \{x}, i.e., “advancing” x means raising
the willingness to approve of it.
The Maximal Partial Consensus (MaxParC, MPC) method now works as follows. A voter ap-
proves of an option if enough other voters do so as well; a non-abstaining voter i is drawn
uniformly at random; then from the highest-scoring options approved by i, one is drawn uni-
formly at random. Once it is decided who approves of what, the procedure corresponds to what
is described in (20), page 4 (last paragraph of section 3), and analysed in (16) under the name
‘Conditional Utilitarian Rule’.
To define this formally, we will introduce the following mathematical objects. The set A(x)
will be the set of voters i that turn out to approve of x since their willingness to approve of x,
βi(x), is properly larger than 100× (1− |A(x)|/N). The quantity a′(x) will be x’s approval score
plus a fractional part used for tiebreaking. The set Ai will be the set of options approved by
i, and A′i the set of highest-scoring options in Ai. Finally, A(∅) will be those voters who don’t
approve of any option and thus “effectively abstain”.
Formally, their definition is this: For all x ∈ C, let A(x) be the largest subset A ⊆ E such
that |A|/N + βi(x)/100 > 1 for all i ∈ A. Let a′(x) = |A(x)|+ ∑i∈E βi(x)/100N. For all i ∈ E,
put Ai = {x ∈ C : i ∈ A(x)} and A′i = argmaxy∈Ai a′(y). Finally, put A(∅) = E −
⋃
x∈E A(x). Then
M(β)x =
∑{1/|A′i | : i ∈ E with x ∈ A′i}/(N − |A(∅)|).
A bullet vote is to rate one option at 100 and all others at 0, while abstention means rating
all options at 0.
Note: since A(x) can be found in N log N time, the total tallying complexity is O(kN log N).
1.3 Agent-based simulations
1.3.1 Modeling individual preferences
We simulate voter preferences by using one of several different models to generate a profile of
individual utility functions over options, ui : C→ R, and then derive individual utility functions
over lotteries depending on each voters risk attitude type. Our utility models are the following.
Uniform model (Unif) In this simplest non-spatial utility model, each value ui(x) is drawn
uniformly at random from the unit interval [0,1]. The resulting preference orderings form what
is usually called the impartial culture model (23).
Block model (BM) In this non-spatial utility model, there are r ≥ 1 voter blocks whose ex-
pected relative sizes s1, . . . , sr are drawn independently from a log-normal distribution such that
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ln s j ∼ N(0,h), where h ≥ 0 is a block size heterogeneity parameter. In particular, if h = 0, all
blocks are of similar size, while larger values of h will lead to ever smaller minorities.
For each voter i independently, the probability to belong to block j is then s j/
∑r
j′=1 s j′ . Let
J(i) be i’s block. Then the utility ui(x) that voter i would get from option x is now a sum of a
block-dependent component and an individual component,
ui(x) = UJ(i)(x) + ιεi(x), (2)
where all UJ(i)(x) and εi(x) are independent standard normal variables and ι > 0 is an individu-
ality parameter.
Spatial preference models In the spatial theory of voting (24) (also called “spatial cultures”
in (23)), voters i and options x are represented by ideal points (or bliss points) ηi and positions
ξx in a low-dimensional policy space Rd, d ≥ 1, and the utility ui(x) that voter i would get from
option x depends in a monotonically decreasing fashion on the distance between ηi and ξx. We
distinguish the following spatial voting models:
Linear homogeneous (LH) model. Utilities are decreasing linearly with distance,
ui(x) = −||ηi− ξx||1 (3)
where the ξx are distributed independently and uniformly on the cube [−1,1]d, and the ηi are
distributed independently and uniformly on the cube [−ω,ω]d, where ω > 0 is a voter hetero-
geneity parameter.
Quadratic homogeneous (QH) model. Utilities decrease quadratically with distance,
ui(x) = −||ηi− ξx||22, (4)
the ξx are distributed independently according to the multivariate standard normal distribution,
and the ηi according to the symmetric multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and
standard deviation ω.
Gaussian homogeneous (GH) model. As in the quadratic homogeneous model, but with
Gaussian utilities
ui(x) = e−||ηi−ξx||
2
2/2σ
2
(5)
for some σ > 0.
In addition to the above, rather classical spatial models, we also use the following three variants,
which introduce some idea borrowed from what (23) calls “distributive cultures”:
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Gaussian allotment (GA) model. As in the Gaussian homogeneous model, but with each
option having a different standard deviation σx > 0, so that
ui(x) = e−||ηi−ξx||
2
2/2σ
2
x/(
√
2piσx)d. (6)
The interpretation is that each option x allots a unit amount of total utility to all potential ideal
points of voters using a symmetric multivariate normal distribution whose standard deviation
σx represents the broadness of option x’s “platform”. Because of the normalization factor σ−dx ,
if two options have very close positions but different broadness, voters close to their position
will prefer the “narrower” option and voters farther away will prefer the “broader” option.
Quadratic allotment (QA) model. As in the Gaussian allotment model, but with log-
transformed utilities, resulting in a quadratic functional form:
ui(x) = −||ηi− ξx||22/2σ2x−d ln(
√
2piσx). (7)
The interpretation is that here option x allots a unit amount of total wealth instead of a unit
amount of total utility, and voters’ utility is logarithmic in wealth.
Linear allotment (LA) model. As in the quadratic allotment model, but with ξx and ηi
distributed on cubes as in the linear homogeneous model, and with a linearly decreasing utility:
ui(x) = −||ηi− ξx||1/σx−d ln(2σx). (8)
The interpretation is that each option x allots a unit amount of total wealth to all potential
ideal points of voters using a symmetric multivariate exponential distribution with density
e−||ηi−ξx||1/σx/(2σ)d, and that utility is logarithmic in wealth.
Distribution of options’ broadnesses. In the three allotment models, we draw the op-
tions’ broadnessesσx independently from a log-normal distribution such that lnσx ∼N(lnσ0,%),
where σ0 > 0 is the median broadness and % ≥ 0 is a broadness heterogeneity parameter. The
three homogeneous models are then equivalent to the case % = 0 of the allotment models.
Utility of uncertain prospects Regarding their preferences over uncertain prospects, repre-
sented as proper lotteries ` ∈ L(C) over options, we assume each voter is of one of three risk
attitude types that determine how they derive utility functions over lotteries from their utility
functions over options.
Expected utility theory. We assume voters of expected utility theory (EUT) type evaluate
the utility of a lottery of options ` ∈ L(C) by taking the expected value of the individual options’
utilities, ui(`) =
∑
x∈C `(x)ui(x). To see a major qualitative difference between the above linear,
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quadratic, and Gaussian models, consider the one-dimensional case of three options placed
symmetrically at ξA = −1, ξB = 1, ξC = 0 with σx ≡ 1, and compare the utility a non-central
voter at ηi ≥ 2 will assign to the “compromise” option C and to the “polar” lottery ` = (A+ B)/2
(tossing a coin to decide between A and B). In the LH model, ui(C) = ui(`), i.e., the voter is
indifferent between the compromise option and the polar lottery. In the QH model, ui(C)> ui(`),
i.e., the voter prefers the compromise. In the GH model, ui(C) < ui(`), i.e., the voter prefers the
polar lottery. More generally, this means that the quadratic/Gaussian models tend to have a
larger/smaller number of potential consensus options than the linear models, respectively.
Cumulative prospect theory. Motivated by recent empirical evidence (25), we assume
that only about 20 percent of voters are of EUT type, while the remaining 80 percent evaluate `
instead as follows.
40 percent are of low-expectations cumulative prospect theory (LCP) type. Such a voter
i treats all options she prefers to her least-desired one as “gains”, hence sorts the options
by descending utility, ui(x1) ≥ ui(x2) . . . ≥ ui(xk), calculates the cumulative probabilities c j =∑ j
j′=1 `(x j′), so that c0 = 0 and ck = 1, and then evaluates ` as
ui(`) =
k∑
j=1
w jui(x j), (9)
where w j = W(c j)−W(c j−1), W(c) = δcγ/(δcγ + (1− c)γ) is the probability weighting function
with W(0) = 0 and W(1) = 1, and we choose δ= 0.926 and γ = 0.377 following the pooled group
estimates for gains from (25).
The remaining 40 percent are of high-expectations cumulative prospect theory (HCP) type.
Such a voter i treats all options except her favourite one as “losses”, hence sorts the options
by ascending utility, ui(x1) ≤ ui(x2) . . . ≤ ui(xk), calculates the cumulative probabilities c j =∑ j
j′=1 `(x j′), so that c0 = 0 and ck = 1, and then evaluates ` as
ui(`) =
k∑
j=1
w jui(x j), (10)
where w,W are as above, but now with δ = 0.991 and γ = 0.397 following the pooled group
estimates for losses from (25).
Generic utilities. Note that due to the involvement of independent continuously distributed
utility components, in all our utility models the resulting utility functions ui will be generic with
probability one in the following sense. Different rational-valued lotteries ` , `′ ∈ L(C)∩QC
will have different utilities ui(`) , ui(`′), so that each voter will have strict preferences over all
pairs of rational-valued lotteries. In particular, each voter will have a unique favourite option
fi = argmaxx∈C ui(x) ∈C.
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1.3.2 Voting behaviour
Polling and final voting rounds. In our simulation model, the actual voting round is preceded
by a number R > 0 of polling rounds. In each polling round, voters are asked to name their
favourite and all options they “approve” of, and the total favourite polling scores f p(x) and
approval polling scores ap(x) are published so that voters can base their voting behaviour in
later polling rounds and the final voting round on this information. The actual voting round
is then assumed to consist of an initial ballot that can then be changed for some time in an
interactive phase as a response to the current ballots’ tallying results, so that our setup allows
for the simulation of the emergence of strategic equilibria.
We assume that each voter i is of either of five behavioural types τ(i): sincere, lazy, heuristic,
trial-and-error, or factional. Heuristic and factional voters together form the set of “strategic”
voters, which we assume to make up about half the electorate.3 Trial-and-error and factional
voters together form the set of “interactive” voters who will potentially change their ballots
during the interactive phase. For lack of empirical data on interactive voting systems, we assume
that these also make up about half of the electorate, while the rest will stick to their ballots
during the interactive phase. Lazy voters, filling in their ballots in the simplest possible and
non-strategic way, are assumed to make up about one sixth of the electorate.4 We assume that
about another sixth is sincere and fills in their ballots non-strategically to best represent their
actual preferences. Together with the above assumptions, this implies that also about one sixth
is heuristic, using a simple form of strategic reasoning, about one sixth is of trial-and-error type,
starting sincerely but testing simple modifications during the interactive phase, and about one
third is of factional type, starting heuristically and following best-response strategies proposed
by their faction leaders during the interactive phase. Although some studies also suggest that
some voters do not sufficiently understand elections in order to vote sincerely or at least properly
lazily, but will rather vote more or less erratically, we do not include an erratic type here since
it would only increase the noise in the data.
3One of the few countries in which the election outcome can be used for a rough assessment of the percentage
of voters who take into account strategic reasoning is Germany because of the strategic incentive to “split vote”
by voting for different parties with your first and second votes. Several studies show that in recent parliamentary
elections about half of the voters who had an incentive to “split vote” because their favoured party had no chance of
winning a direct mandate actually did split their vote ( (26), p.17). Using an elaborate methodology, (27) classified
voters in Germany’s 2013 parliamentary elections into several behavioural types and found that about 15.9 per cent
had an incentive to split and did split, while 11.9 per cent had an incentive to split and didn’t split ( (27) Table 1),
i.e., 57 per cent of those with an incentive to vote strategically did so.
4One of the few systems in which the election outcome can be used for a rough assessment of the percentage of
voters who supply less information on their ballot than would be advisable is the Single Transferable Vote system
used in Ireland’s parliamentary elections because voters may keep their submited ranking so short that during the
iterative tallying process their vote gets “exhausted” and thus essentially wasted. Election outcomes suggest that
between 10 and 25 per cent of voters are “lazy” in this sense (the number of exhausted votes can be calculated
easily from public data, e.g., on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dublin_Central_%28D%C3%A1il_%C3%
89ireann_constituency%29, by comparing the elected candidates total vote turnout with the number of cast
ballots)
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In addition to this “middle”scenario, we test two further scenarios, one “strategic” and one
“lazy”,5 with behavioural types distributed according to the probabilities listed in Table 1.
We now specify our behavioural assumptions for the five types.
Sincere voters (τ(i) = S ). A sincere voter fills in her ballot b in a certain way that represents
her “true” preferences, in particular so that the stated preferences Pb are compatible with her
true preferences in the sense that x Pb y implies ui(x) > ui(y). Since many ballot types allow
for more than one way of sincere voting, we make the following explicit assumptions for the
different voting methods. Several of these make use of the benchmark lottery ` ∈ L(C) whose
winning probabilities are proportional to the latest favourite polling scores, `(x) = f p(x)/N, and
on its expected utility ui(`) =
∑
x∈C `(x)ui(x). The MaxParC sincere strategy also makes use of
an estimate α ∈ [0,1] of the proportion of lazy voters in the electorate.
• In the first polling round, she names her true favourite and approves of all x with above-
average utility, using equal weights for all options.
• In later polling rounds, she names her true favourite and approves of all x with above-
average utility, using weights based on the latest favourite polling scores, as in Approval
Voting.
• In the actual voting round, her initial and final ballot is determined like this:
– In Plurality and Random Ballot, she marks her true favourite: b = fi.
– In Approval Voting, she marks all x with at-least-average utility, where the average
is weighted with the latest favourite polling scores so that “approval” is with respect
to the benchmark of the currently most relevant seeming options: b(x) = 1 iff ui(x) ≥
ui(`).
– In Range Voting and the Nash Lottery, she assigns ratings from 0 to 100 proportional
to utility: b(x) = 100 ui(x)−miny∈C ui(y)maxy∈C ui(y)−miny∈C ui(y) .
– In IRV and Simple Condorcet, she ranks all x with at-least-average utility as in
Approval Voting, in correct order of preference: b(x) = |{y ∈ C : ui(y) ≥ ui(x)}| iff
ui(x) ≥ ui(`), else b(x) =∞.
– In FC, she marks her true favourite as “favourite” and marks that option as “consen-
sus” which has the highest approval polling score among those options she herself
approves of: b = (argmaxx∈C ui(x),argmaxx∈C,ui(x)≥ui(`) ap(x)).6
– In RFC, she combines a sincere FC ballot with a sincere Range Voting ballot.
5In many US elections, voters may use a so-called “straight ticket” which might be interpreted as indicating a
certain level of lazyness. As there are often up to or even more than half of all voters using straight ticket voting,
we assume that in the “lazy” scenario half of the voters are lazy.
6In the rare cases where several ap(x) are equal, we use f p(x) as a first-order tie-breaker and ui(x) as a second-
order tie-breaker.
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– In MaxParC, she assigns a willingness of 0 to all non-approved options, and will-
ingness values from 100α to 100 scaling linearly with utility for all other options:
b(x) = 0 if ui(x) < ui(`), else b(x) = 100
(
α+ (1−α) ui(x)−ui(`)maxy∈C ui(y)−ui(`)
)
.7
Lazy voters (τ(i) = L). A lazy voter marks or ranks (only) her true favourite in Plurality, Ran-
dom Ballot, Approval Voting, IRV, and Simple Condorcet, marks the same option as consensus
in FC and RFC, and gives it a rating/willingness of 100 and all others a rating/willingness of
zero in Range Voting, the Nash Lottery, RFC, and MaxParC (“bullet voting”).
Heuristic voters (τ(i) = H). Heuristic voters try to adjust their voting behaviour to that of
the other voters in order to increase the chances of preferred options and avoid “wasting their
vote”. But since their information is restricted to polling scores, they can only act boundedly
rational. In addition, we assume they do not employ full optimization given that data but rather
use more or less simple or moderately complex “heuristic” strategies (28) mainly based on
the idea of “exaggerating” their stated preferences regarding the two options between which a
nip-and-tuck race seems most likely (29, 30), and possibly taking into account next-most likely
nip-and-tuck races as well. For the more complex voting methods, we do however allow for
heuristics that require basic computational tasks such as forming sums, products and ratios and
following simple decision trees.
• In polling rounds, she acts as in Plurality and Approval Voting, while in the actual voting
round, her initial and final ballot is determined as follows.
• In Plurality, she marks her preferred option among the two best-placed in the latest
favourite polling scores: b = y if ui(y) > ui(z), else b = z, where y = argmaxx∈C f p(x)
and z = argmaxx∈C\{y} f p(x).8
• In Approval Voting, she marks all x she prefers to the option y leading the latest approval
polling scores, and marks y iff she prefers y to the runner-up z in the latest approval polling
scores: b(x) = 1 iff (ui(x) > ui(y) or x = y and ui(y) > ui(z)), where y = argmaxx∈C ap(x)
and z = argmaxx∈C\{y} ap(x).9
7This is the simplest sincere voting heuristic for MaxParC that (i) guarantees that my share of winning prob-
ability goes to an option which I prefer to the benchmark lottery, that (ii) leads to full consensus if applied by all
and if a potential full consensus exists, and that (iii) otherwise leads to partial consensus with a high probability if
the utility-by-distance curves are rather concave (as in the LH, QH, LA and QA models) than convex (as in the GH
and GA models). See Section 2.3.1 for a more detailed discussion of this and for alternative heuristic formulas for
sincere voting under MaxParC.
8The rationale is that your vote is most relevant in a nip-and-tuck race, and the most likely nip-and-tuck race is
between the favourite poll’s leader and runner-up, so that you should vote for your preferred one among those two.
9This is called the “leader rule” in (31), see also (32, 33). Since the most likely nip-and-tuck race is between
the approval poll’s leader and runner-up, you should approve only your preferred among those two. Since the next
likely nip-and-tuck race is between the leader and some other option, you should also approve of all options you
prefer to the leader.
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• In Range Voting, she applies the same strategy as in Approval Voting to find her “ap-
proved” options, then assigns a rating of 100 to approved options and a rating of 0 to the
other options.10
• In IRV, she denotes the options in descending order of their latest approval polling scores
as x0, x1, . . . , xk−1 and then constructs her ranking as follows: In rank 1 she puts either x0
or x1 depending on which she prefers, and labels the other option as y. Then, for each
rank r = 2,3, . . . ,k− 1, she puts either y or xr in rank r, depending on which she prefers,
and labels the other option as the new y.11
• In Simple Condorcet, she finds y,z as in Approval Voting, assigns a tied rank of one to
her preferred option among y,z and all options she prefers to both, assigns sincere ranks
to those other options she prefers to at least one of y,z, and doesn’t rank the less preferred
option among y,z and all she considers even less desirable.
• In Random Ballot, FC and RFC, she acts like a sincere voter.
• In the Nash Lottery, she first uses the latest favourite polling scores to compute the utility
υ of the benchmark lottery with probabilities f p(x)/N. She then computes her rating
for any x based on x’s apparent chances as estimated by f p(x)/N and on the difference
between ui(x) and υ as follows. If she is of EU type, she has υ =
∑
x∈C u1(x) f p(x)/N and
uses
b(x) = 1 +
f p(x)(ui(x)−υ)
maxy∈C f p(y)(υ−ui(y)) , (11)
where the denominator is chosen so that the smallest resulting rating is exactly zero.12 If
she is LCP or HCP type, she similarly uses
b(x j) = 1 +
w j(ui(x j)−υ)
maxkj′=1 w j′(υ−ui(x j′))
, (12)
with x j,w j as described in the LCP and HCP models above.
• In MaxParC, she applies the same strategy as in Approval Voting to find her “approved”
options, then assigns to an approved option x a willingness that is at least as large as
10Following the same rationale.
11The rationale here is that the most likely nip-and-tuck race is between x0 and x1, in which case her vote must
go to the better of those from beginning on. Her 2nd ranked option only becomes relevant when the 1st ranked gets
eliminated during the tally, in which case the most likely race is between the other (y) and x2, so she should rank
the better of those two 2nd. Her r-th ranked option only becomes relevant when all higher ranked get eliminated,
in which case the most likely race is between the one option among x0, . . . , xr−1 not yet ranked, which is the current
y, and xr, so she should rank the better of those two next. See also (34), Fig. 3, and (35).
12The rationale is that if some options appear to have higher chances than others, exaggerating one’s preferences
regarding these options will increase one’s influence (see Section 2.3.2 for a formal derivation of this heuristic
strategy). In the special case where all f p(x) are equal, the strategy reduces to voting sincerely.
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her sincere MaxParC willingness for x and large enough to make sure she is counted as
approving of x should x’s approval score be as predicted by ap(x). More precisely, she
puts
b(x) = max{bs(x),101−100ap(x)/N}, (13)
where bs(x) = max{0,100 ui(x)−ui(`)maxy∈C ui(y)−ui(`) }. To a non-approved option x, she assigns a
willingness at most her sincere willingness and small enough so that she is counted as not
approving of x:
b(x) = min{bs(x),99−100ap(x)/N}. (14)
Interactive voting. We assume that in the final voting round voters have to submit a ballot but
can then still change their ballots continuously over some time interval during which they can
observe the resulting tally statistics in real-time, thus introducing the possibility to interactively
test voting strategies and react on others’ strategies. We assume there are two additional types of
voters who will change their votes during this interval: “trial-and-error” voters and “factional”
voters, while all other voters submit an initial ballot as described above and don’t change it af-
terwards. This interactive phase is simulated long enough so that in typical situations a strategic
equilibrium can emerge. Before the interactive phase starts, these voters behave like heuristic
voters. In the interactive phase, they vote as follows:
Trial-and-error voters (τ(i) = T ). The interactive phase consists of a large number of con-
secutive time points, at each of which some percentage of the trial-and-error voters will update
their ballots. When a trial-and-error voter i updates her ballot, she picks a random modification
out of a set of elementary modifications that depend on the ballot type (see below), submits
the modified ballot, observes the resulting change in utility ui due to all simulateneous modifi-
cations, and either sticks to or undoes the modification. She undoes the modification if either
ui has decreased or if ui has stayed constant and the modification was towards a strictly less
“sincere” ballot (see below).
We assume these elementary modifications:
• On a Plurality, FC, or RFC Ballot, either the favourite or the consensus option may be
replaced by any other option.
• On an Approval Ballot, one can add or remove approval for a single option.
• On a Range, MaxParC, or RFC Ballot, one can replace the rating or willingness value for
a single option by any value in [0,100].
• A Truncated or Weak Ranking Ballot b may be replaced by another such ballot b′ if for
some option x, Pb|C\{x} = Pb′ |C\{x}, i.e., a single option x may be moved to an arbitrary
new position in the ranking, making place for it by shifting the other ranks if necessary.
27
In Random Ballot, trial-and-error voters will always vote sincerely since that is a dominant
strategy.
A modified ballot b′ is strictly less sincere than b if:
• In Plurality and FC: ui(b′) < ui(b) (resp. ui(b′1) < ui(b1) for FC).
• In Approval Voting, IRV, Simple Condorcet, and MaxParC: e(b′) > e(b) with e(b) =
|{(x,y) ∈C2 : ui(x) > ui(y) but y Pb x}| (number of wrongly stated binary preferences).
• In Range Voting and the Nash Lottery: ||b′−bs|| > ||b−bs||, where bs is the sincere ballot
described above.
• In RFC: ui(b′1) ≤ ui(b1) and ||b′3−bs|| ≥ ||b3−bs||, but not both equal.
Trial-and-error voters behave as sincere voters during polling and also start the interactive
phase with a sincere ballot.
Factional voters (τ(i) = F). Since strategic voting can be much more effective when coordi-
nating with other voters having similar preferences, we assume that voters of this type change
their ballots as follows during the interactive phase, starting it with a heuristic ballot as described
above, and after voting as heuristic voters in the polling rounds, too.
For each x ∈C, we consider the “faction” Fx of all voters i with τi = F favouring x, Fx = {i ∈
E : τi = F, fi = x}. Each faction Fx is assumed to possess enough information and computing
capabilities to calculate a best unanimous response to all other voters’ current ballots, which
is a voting behaviour where all i ∈ Fx submit the same filled-in ballot and no other unanimous
voting behaviour of all i ∈ Fx would generate a strictly higher total utility U = ∑i∈Fx ui given
that all other voters j ∈ E \Fx submit the same ballots as before. The assumption that factions
cannot coordinate their members to vote differently even if that might be better than all voting
the same way can be interpreted as a form of bounded rationality.
During the interactive phase, each faction, whether small or large, has the same constant
probability rate for updating their ballots, leading to a Poisson process of updates by randomly
picked factions. When a faction Fx updates their ballots, they replace their current ballots by a
best unanimous response to all other voters’ current ballots as follows:
• In Plurality, they find the plurality scores p(y) resulting from all other voters’ ballots,
find the set A of options less than |Fx| many votes behind the leader, A = {y ∈ C : p(y) +
|Fx| >maxz∈C p(z)}, and vote for that y ∈ A which maximizes U: b = argmaxy∈A U(y) with
U(y) =
∑
i∈Fx ui(y).
• In Approval Voting, they find y in the same way as in Plurality, only using approval scores
instead of plurality scores, and then bullet vote for it: b(y) = 1, b(z) = 0 for all z , y.
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• In Range Voting, they find y in the same way as in Plurality, only using Range Voting
scores divided by 100 instead of plurality scores, and then bullet vote for it: b(y) = 100,
b(z) = 0 for all z , y.
• In IRV, they find the best response truncated ranking ballot by constructing a set A of
“candidate” truncated rankings (x1, x2, . . . , x`) that cover all possible results they can effect
by submitting identical ballots, and then select the member of A that gives the best result.
A is constructed iteratively by adding ever longer truncated rankings as follows. Given
all other voters’ ballots, they start by finding the set Y of options y ∈ C for which y
survives the elimination process during the tally strictly longer when they rank y 1st than
when they submit a blank ballot. They put A = {(y) : y ∈ Y}. Then, for each ranking
(x1, x2, . . . , x`) ∈ A with ` < k−1, they find the set Y of options y for which y survives the
elimination process during the tally strictly longer when they submit the longer ranking
(x1, x2, . . . , x`,y) than when they submit the shorter ranking (x1, x2, . . . , x`). They add all
those ballots (x1, x2, . . . , x`,y) to A and iterate until no further ballots are added. One can
show that for each possible truncated ranking ballot, there is a member of A that has the
same effect when used as the unanimous ballot of all faction members, and |A| ≤ 2k.13
• In Simple Condorcet, they find the binary opposition values o(y,z) resulting from all
other voters’ ballots, and put o(y) = maxz∈C o(y,z), o0 = miny∈C o(y), and A = {y ∈ C :
o(y) < o0 + |Fx|}. For each y ∈ A, they put Ay = {z ∈ A : o(z) < o(y)}, and check whether
there is a function g : Ay → C such that {(z,g(z)) : z ∈ Ay} is acyclic and for all z ∈ Ay,
o(z,g(z))+ |Fx| > o(y). If this is the case, y can be made the winner by ranking the options
in any way that ranks y first and ranks each z ∈ Ay below its g(z). Among these y ∈ A,
they find the one with the largest U(y) and submit any ranking which ranks y first, ranks
each z ∈ Ay below its g(z), and doesn’t rank any further options. If no such y exists, they
submit a bullet vote for x.
• In Random Ballot, they mark their true favourite since that is a dominant strategy: b =
argmaxx∈C ui(x).
• In FC, they mark their true favourite as “favourite” and find an optimal option for marking
as “consensus” by computing the resulting U for all of the k many possible choices.
• In RFC, they submit sincere ratings and find an optimal combination of options for mark-
ing as “favourite” and “consensus” by computing the resulting U for all of the k2 many
possible combinations.
• In the Nash Lottery, they try to find a (globally) best response by starting with a common
ballot derived by averaging the faction members’ sincere Nash Lottery ballots (see above)
and then following a simple steepest ascent optimization algorithm until reaching a (local)
13See Section 2.3.3 for a proof sketch.
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optimum of U(x). Although this local optimum might not be a globally best response, we
assume they use the resulting ballot anyway, which can be considered an additional form
of bounded rationality.
• In MaxParC, they compare the results of all the 2k many ballots bA of the form bA(x) = 100
if x ∈ A and bA(x) = 0 else, for some subset of options A ⊆C. They identify that A which
maximizes U given all others’ ballots. Note that the corresponding bA is a unanimous
best response since only the resulting approvals matter. For this A, they calculate the
approval scores ay that would result from using ballot bA in MaxParC given all others’
ballots. Then they define
w(y) =
∑
i∈Fx
max{0,100 ui(y)−ui(`)
maxz∈C ui(z)−ui(`) }/|Fx|, (15)
which is the average sincere ballot of the faction members, and use the ballot with
b(y) = max{100(1−ay/N),w(y)} (16)
for y ∈ A and
b(y) = min{99(1−ay/N),w(y)} (17)
for y < A, which leads to the same approvals as bA and is thus also a best unanimous
response. In other words, they use that best unanimous response which is closest to the
average sincere ballot.
• In polling rounds, they act as in Plurality and Approval Voting.
Note that if a steady state emerges, it approximates a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium be-
tween the trial-and-error voters as individual players and the factions as aggregate players,
which will in general however not be a strong or coalition-proof equilibrium since although
we regard factions, we do not regard inter-factional coalitional strategies. Also, the process
may also lead to cyclic or more complex attractors rather than a steady state.
1.3.3 Experiment design
We generated M = 1,293,906 many independent group decision problems, drawing their pa-
rameters independently from the following probability distributions (where parameter names in
code are set in this font):
Number of voters N. We drew odd numbers between 9 and 999 such that log10 N was approx-
imately uniformly distributed in the interval [1,3].
Number of options k. Uniformly in {3, . . . ,9}.
Preference models. Uniformly in {Unif, BM, GA, QA, LA}.
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BM parameters. For the block model: number of voter blocks Bmr = r ∼ Unif{2,5,9}, block
size heterogeneity Bmh = h ∼ Unif{0,1}, individuality Bmiota = ι ∼ Unif{0.1,0.5}.
Spatial model parameters. For GA, QA, and LA: policy space dimension dim= d ∼Unif{1,2,3},
voter heterogeneity omega = ω ∼ Unif{1,2,3,5}, option broadness heterogeneity rho
= ρ ∼ Unif{0,1/3,2/3,1}, where ρ = 0 corresponds to the homogenous cases GH, QH,
LH.
Risk attitude scenarios. Uniformly in {all-EUT, all-LCP, all-HCP, mixed}, where in ‘mixed’
20% of the voters are EUT, 40% LCP, and 40% HCP.
Number of polling rounds R. Uniformly in {1,2,3,5,7,10}.
Behavioural type scenarios. Uniformly in {lazy, middle, strat, all-L, all-S, all-T, all-H, all-F}
The following parameters were not varied:
Length of interactive phase. 100 time points.
Trial-and-error frequency. At each time point, 50% of the trial-and-error voters updated their
ballots.
Factional update probability. At each time point, each faction had a 10% probability to up-
date their ballots.
For each group decision problem, we constructed a second problem in which a randomly
chosen option was replaced by a compromise option y that was constructed from set C0 of
the remaining k− 1 options, to analyse the effect that a specifically designed compromise op-
tion would have. Depending on the preference model, voters’ preferences about y were con-
structed as follows: In Unif and BM, the compromise got the average utility of the other op-
tions, ui(y) =
∑
x∈C0 ui(x)/(k−1); in GH, QH, and LH, the compromise’s position ξy was chosen
to be a weighted average of the other options’ positions ξx, with weights wx proportional to
first-preference support and inversely proportional to options’ platforms’ broadness σx:
ξy =
∑
x∈C0
wxξx/
∑
x∈C0
wx, (18)
wx = |{i ∈ E : x = argmax
z∈C ui(z)}|/σx. (19)
For each of these 2M decision problems, we simulated R rounds of polling. Finally, for each of
the ten voting methods independently, we simulated an initial voting round and an interactive
voting phase14 based on the same polling results, and determined all options’ resulting winning
probabilities ` both after the initial voting round and after the interactive phase.
14For the basically deterministic IRV, we did not calculate tie probabilities since this would have been too costly
due to the iterative nature of the method; instead, we resolved ties in IRV randomly, so that the resulting lottery
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1.3.4 Social welfare metrics
To measure the welfare effects of the tested voting methods, we use a set of metrics which are
based on three different social welfare measures (utilitarian, Gini-Sen, and egalitarian welfare),
taken either on an absulute or a relative scale, and either taken before or after the interactive
phase of the simulations, giving a total of twelfe different metrics per problem and method.
All these measures are aggregating the voters’ individual utility ui(`) they get from the re-
sulting lottery `, as modelled by the various utility models discussed above. In applications
where there is only a single decision taken, these measures must hence be interpreted as mea-
suring the ‘ex ante’ efficiency of the method, as opposed to the ‘ex post’ efficiency that would be
based on the utilities of the actual options chosen by the resulting lottery. In applications where
we imagine a sequence of decisions, our efficiency metrics can be interpreted as measuring the
long-run efficiency of the method over the whole sequence of decisions.
Utilitarian welfare The simplest and most popular measure is the one proposed by average
utilitarianism, Wutil.(`) =
∑
i∈E ui(`)/|E|.
Since in all our utility models, lottery utility ui(`) is a linear combination of option utilities
ui(x), the lottery that maximizes Wutil.(`) is a sure-thing lottery.
Gini-Sen welfare As Wutil.(`) is insensitive to redistribution of utility across voters, and hence
to inequality between voters’ utilities, we also use two inequality-averse metrics, the first of
which is the Gini-Sen welfare function WGini(`) =
∑
i∈E
∑
j∈E\{i}min{ui(`),u j(`)}/|E|(|E| −1).
As a motivating story one can imagine voters meet in a large sequence of bilateral meetings
and each time evaluate the welfare status of society welfare in terms of the smaller of their
two utilities, and overall social welfare is then measured by the average of all these individ-
ual pairwise evaluations. Another motivation for the same metric is that it can be seen as an
“inequality-adjusted” version of Wutil., since we have WGini(`) = Wutil.(`)(1− IGini(`)), where
IGini(`) is the well-known Gini coefficient of inequality in utilities ui(`) (36).
Note that the lottery `∗ which maximizes WGini(`) can be expected to be a proper lottery
rather than a sure-thing lottery. This is because randomization tends to reduce inequality more
than it reduces average utility.
Egalitarian welfare As the most extremely inequality-averse welfare metric, we also con-
sider the egalitarian one, Wegal.(`) = mini∈E ui(`). As in the case of Gini-Sen welfare, maximiza-
tion of ex-ante egalitarian welfare usually requires randomization.
always appeared to be a sure-thing lottery instead of the true tying lottery. For the NL method, the optimization
problem maxS (`) was solved using Sequential Least Squares Programming (SLSQP); to avoid a convergence
failure due to singular Jacobian matrices because of zero ratings, we added 10−5 to all ratings (the maximal rating
always being 100). In the interactive phase of NL, a faction’s best response ratings optimization problem was
solved using Constrained Optimization By Linear Approximation (COBYLA) since that converged better than
SLSQP.
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Absolute and relative welfare metrics All three welfare metrics measure welfare on the
same scale as individual utility, hence are hard to compare directly across different utility models
since these use quite different scales. Also, for some models their distribution is quite skewed,
having a long lower tail. In addition to the above absolute welfare metrics, we therefore also
compare the relative metrics
relWutil./Gini/egal.(`) =
Wutil./Gini/egal.(`)−minx∈C Wutil./Gini/egal.(x)
maxx∈C Wutil./Gini/egal.(x)−minx∈C Wutil./Gini/egal.(x) ∈ [0,∞] (20)
which rescale the welfare so that the sure-thing (!) lotteries giving the lowest and highest
welfare get scores 0 and 1, respectively. This design allows us to interpret values larger than 1
as welfare gains from randomization.
Still, as it turned out, the relative versions of Gini-Sen and egalitarian welfare often take
very large values for nondeterministic methods and thus now have a very skewed distribution
with a long upper tail. For this reason, we also study an alternative relative version of all three
metrics, defined as
altrelWutil./Gini/egal.(`) = 2
Wutil./Gini/egal.(`)−minx∈C Wutil./Gini/egal.(x)
Wutil./Gini/egal.(`) + maxx∈C Wutil./Gini/egal.(x)−2minx∈C Wutil./Gini/egal.(x)
(21)
=
2relWutil./Gini/egal.(`)
1 + relWutil./Gini/egal.(`)
∈ [0,2]. (22)
These are now restricted to the interval [0,2], again taking a value of 0 and 1 for the sure-thing
(!) lotteries giving the lowest and highest welfare.
“Cost of fairness” As an alternative to the above relative welfare metrics, one can also com-
pare welfare differences between methods with utility differences within the electorate to assess
the influence of method choice on welfare. In analogy to the notion of a “price of anarchy” (37),
we therefore define a “relative cost of fairness”,
CF =
WRVutil −W MPCutil
WRVutil −WRVegal
, (23)
where the numerator is the absolute difference in average voter utility between the best deter-
ministic method RV’s result and the best proportional method MaxParC’s result (which could
be termed the “absolute cost of fairness”), and the denominator is the difference between the
average and minimum voter utility under RV (which could be termed the “absolute egalitarian
inequality”).
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1.3.5 Randomization metrics
To measure the degree of randomization a voting method actually applies, we computed two
established entropy measures, Shannon entropy and Re´nyi entropy of degree two, and the max-
imal probability maxx∈C `x, again applied to the results before and after the interactive phase.
This gives six randomization metrics in total per problem and method.
1.3.6 Voter satisfaction metrics
As another type of performance indicators, we computed each voter’s “satisfaction level”
ui(`)−minx∈C ui(x)
maxx∈C ui(x)−minx∈C ui(x) ∈ [0,1], (24)
which would be zero if i’s least preferred option won for sure, and unity if i’s favourite won for
sure. Based on these, we report average satisfaction levels in the whole electorate and, to assess
possible advantages of strategic behaviour, by behavioural type.
1.3.7 Consequentialist preferences over methods
Finally, to get an idea of which methods voters would chose if that choice was itself performed
by majority voting, we counted for each decision problem how many voters would prefer the
lottery resulting from some method A to that resulting from some method B.
2 Supplementary Text
2.1 Properties of voting methods
2.1.1 Basic consistency properties
Anonymity. A voting method is anonymous iff it treats all voters alike, i.e., iff its result is
invariant under permutations of voters. All considered methods have this property.
Neutrality. A voting method is neutral iff it treats all options alike, i.e., iff the resulting win-
ning probabilities of any two options x,y are swapped when x,y are swapped on all ballots. All
considered methods have this property.
Pareto-efficiency w.r.t. stated preferences. An option y is Pareto-dominated w.r.t. stated
preferences iff there is another option x with x Pβi y for all i ∈ E. A voting method is Pareto-
efficient w.r.t. stated preferences iff all Pareto-dominated options get zero winning probability.
All considered methods except FC and RFC fulfill this. Since in FC, only the fall-back option
is interpreted as stating a preference, a Pareto-dominated y might still be everyone’s proposed
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consensus and win. Similarly, since in RFC only the ratings are interpreted as preferences, y
still might be named by someone as fall-back option and thus have positive winning probability.
It is more difficult to check whether also an option which is Pareto-dominated w.r.t. true
preferences will have zero winning probability, since this depends on whether and how voters
behave strategically. Our numerical simulations at least suggests that all of the considered
methods, including FC and RFC, fulfill this criterion under normal circumstances.
2.1.2 Monotonicity properties
Although there are a number of variants of the ‘monotonicity’ criterion, we here focus on
two variants of Woodall’s ‘mono-raise’ monotonicity (38), which differ only really for non-
deterministic methods, and one properly weaker property related to Woodall’s ‘mono-add-
plump’ monotonicity.
Strong mono-raise monotonicity. A voting method is strongly mono-raise monotonic iff the
winning probability of an option y cannot increase if a different option x is advanced on one
ballot: M(β)y ≤ M(β′)y whenever x , y, βi QCx β′i for some i ∈ E, and β j = β′j for all j ∈ E \ {i}.
Weak mono-raise monotonicity. A voting method is weakly mono-raise monotonic iff the
winning probability of an option x cannot decrease if x is advanced on one ballot: M(β)x ≥
M(β′)x whenever βi QCx β′i for some i ∈ E and β j = β′j for all j ∈ E \ {i}.
Weak mono-raise-abstention monotonicity. We call a voting method weakly mono-raise-
abstention monotonic iff the winning probability of an option x cannot decrease if x is advanced
on an abstention ballot: M(β)x ≥ M(β′)x whenever βi QCx β′i for some i ∈ E, β j = β′j for all
j ∈ E \ {i}, and β′i is an abstention ballot.
Obviously, strong mono-raise monotonicity implies weak mono-raise monotonicity, which
in turn implies weak mono-raise-abstention monotonicity.
For PV, AV, RV, SC, and RB it is straightforward to prove all three forms of mono-raise mono-
tonicity (exercise left to the reader). IRV is known to violate both strong and weak mono-raise
monotonicity (38) but is easily seen to fulfill weak mono-raise-abstention monotonicity.
FC fulfills weak but not strong mono-raise monotonicity since if z is everyone’s proposed
consensus, advancing x on some consensus ballot destroys the consensus so that someone’s
fall-back option y , x can get gets positive winning probability.
RFC violates both weak and strong mono-raise monotonicity. Consider the case of three
options x,y,z and two voters who both name z as consensus and rate (x,y,z) at (0,3,1). If one
names x and the other y as fall-back, x and y both get winning probability 1/2, but if both name
x as fall-back, z wins for sure.
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NL violates strong mono-raise monotonicity. Again consider three options x,y,z and two voters
1,2 who rate them as β1(x,y,z) = (1/2,0,1/6) and β2(x,y,z) = (0,1,3/4). Then M(β)y = 0. But
if we increase β1(x) to 1, we get M(β)y = 1/2 > 0. Numerical simulations suggest that NL
fulfills weak mono-raise monotonicity, which we conjecture but were not able to prove yet
unfortunately.
Regarding weak mono-raise-abstention monotonicity, it was shown in (16) that NL (there
called “Nash Max Product”) fulfills a roughly equivalent condition of “Strict Participation”
when all ballots are “dichotomous” in the sense that all ratings are either zero or 100 (or some
other common, fixed, positive number). Using the Envelope Theorem, we can give an alter-
native proof of weak mono-raise-abstention monotonicity for arbitrary ratings. Proof. Let E,
C be fixed, consider some i ∈ E and x ∈ C, assume β : E → B(C) is fixed except for its entry
βi(x), and assume βi(y) =  for all y ∈ C \ {x}. We will study the change of the NL probabilities
p∗(α) = M(β) as a function of the parameter α = βi(x) and show that α′ > α implies p∗(α′) ≥
p∗(α), which will suffice to prove the claim. p∗(α) is the solution of the maximization of the
continuously differentiable function f (p,α) =
∑
j∈E logh j(p,α) with h j(p,α) =
∑
y∈C β j(y)py and
βi(x) = α under the constraint g(p,α) =
∑
y∈C py = 1. Let V(α) = maxp,g(p,α)=1 f (p,α) be the cor-
responding maximum. Since the constraint is independent of the parameter α, the envelope
theorem implies that
V′(α) = ∂ f (p,α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p=p∗(α)
=
p∗(α)x
hi(p∗(α),α)
. (25)
Now assume an infinitesimal increase in α from α = α0 to α = α1 = α0 + dα with dα > 0. Then
the above implies
V(α1) = V(α0) + V′(α0)dα = f (p∗(α0),α0) +
p∗(α0)x
hi(p∗(α0),α0)
dα, (26)
but also
V(α1) = f (p∗(α1),α1) (27)
= f (p∗(α1),α0) +
∂ f (p,α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p=p∗(α1),α=α0
dα (28)
= f (p∗(α1),α0) +
p∗(α1)x
hi(p∗(α1),α0)
dα. (29)
Since optimization means that f (p∗(α0),α0) ≥ f (p∗(α1),α0), this implies
0 ≤ f (p
∗(α0),α0)− f (p∗(α1),α0)
dα
(30)
=
p∗(α1)x
hi(p∗(α1),α0)
− p
∗(α0)x
hi(p∗(α0),α0)
(31)
=
p∗(α1)x
(α0− )p∗(α1)x +  −
p∗(α0)x
(α0− )p∗(α0)x +  , (32)
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Since  > 0, this implies p∗(α1)x ≥ p∗(α0)x. Since this holds for all values α0 of α, we have
shown that p∗(α)x is a weakly increasing function of α as claimed. Q.E.D.
MaxParC fulfills all three forms. Proof. It suffices to show that if (i) x is advanced by one voter
i from βi(x) = r to βi(x) = r′ > r, (ii) some voter j is drawn at random, and (iii) some option
y , x is in the set A′j after the change, then y must have been in A
′
j before the change and A
′
j can
only have grown due to the change. It is easy to see that A(x) can only have grown and that no
other A(z) has changed, hence a′(x) has properly grown but no other a′(z) has changed. So if y
is in A′j = argmaxz∈A j a
′(z), the value of maxz∈A j a′(z) has not changed, hence y must have been
in this set before, and the only change in A′j can be that now x is also in A
′
j. This means A
′
j can
only have grown and thus y’s winning probability decreased. Q.E.D.
2.1.3 Further consistency properties
Independence from Pareto-dominated alternatives. The idea of this criterion is that the
“removal” of a Pareto-dominated option y from all ballots should have no effect on the winning
probabilities. It was first introduced by Steve Eppley on the election-methods emailing list.15
Since for some methods it is not obvious what is meant by “removal”, we do not study this in a
formal way here but rather discuss it verbally.
For methods using a ballot type that lets voters rate or rank all options independently (AV,
RV, SC, NL and MaxParC), let us assume “removal” means leaving the other options’ ratings
unchanged. For IRV, let us assume “removal” implies decreasing the ranks of the later-ranked
options by one. Then those six methods all fulfill this criterion, and so do Plurality and Random
Ballot whenever no voter has named y as favourite (which rational voters wouldn’t).
As this criterion implies Pareto-efficiency, FC and RFC do not fulfill it.
We note that in particular many other Condorcet-type methods, which elect a winner of all
pairwise comparisons for sure if such an option exists, including the ‘Ranked Pairs’ method by
Nicolaus Tideman (39) and the ‘Beatpath’ methods by Markus Schulze (40), fail this criterion.
Independence from losing options. This criterion demands that the removal of any option
y receiving zero winning probability must have no effect on the winning probabilities. This
is a variation of the famous ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’ criterion, and which is
stronger than Independence from Pareto-dominated alternatives if Pareto-efficiency is given.
It is easy to see that again AV, RV, RB, and NL fulfill this and FC and RFC do not. For PV,
some voters may have voted for y and now vote for the current runner-up and make it win.
IRV and SC also do not, as can be seen from the example of three options x,y,z and three
factions F1,2,3 of sizes 4,3,2 and rankings F1 : x > y > z, F2 : y > z > x, F3 : z > x > y. Both
methods elect x for sure but elect z if y is removed.
15http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2003-March/
107700.html
37
MaxParC also fulfills this criterion. Proof. Removal of y does not change who approves
of which other options. If y has zero winning probability, every voter who approves of y also
approves of some higher-scoring option. Hence for no voter the set of highest-scoring approved
options changes. Thus all other options’ winning probabilities are unaffected. Q.E.D.
An even stronger variant of ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’ that can also be in-
terpreted as a form of ‘monotonicity’ goes as follows: removing any option y from E must
not decrease any remaining option x’s winning probability. NL probably violates this while
MaxParC clearly fulfills it.
Independence from cloned options. Another type of criterion deals with the addition of an
option y, called a ‘clone’, that is very “similar” to some existing option x. Since “similarity”
can be defined in different ways depending on the ballot type, we restrict our interest here to
the special case where y is a unique ‘exact clone’ of x, meaning all voters are truly indifferent
between x and y but not between these two and any further option z. We demand that in that
case and under plausible assumptions on voter’s voting behaviour, the addition of y shall not
change the winning probability of any other option z < {x,y}.
Let us assume that after the addition of y, voters will assign y the exact same approval,
rating, or ranking (if tied rankings are allowed, otherwise an adjacent ranking) as x, and will
name any option z < {x,y} as favourite or proposed consensus iff they named the same option
before the addition, only possibly switching from naming x to now naming y. It is then easy
to see that AV, RV, IRV, SC, RB, RFC, NL and MaxParC all fulfill this form of ‘exact clone
independence’, while PV and FC do not.
Note that there are other, stronger, forms of clone-independence, including the one discussed
in (39), that some variants of IRV, many Condorcet-type methods, NL, and MaxParC might not
fulfill.
Revelation of preferences. Some voting methods have the property that, sometimes depend-
ing on the level of strategic behaviour, voters’ filled-in ballots reveal all or part of their prefer-
ences. Under RB, for example, whenever a voter has an option she strictly prefers to all other
options (a unique favourite), it is a weakly dominant strategy to specify that option. This form
of “strategy-proofness” can be interpreted as implying that RB “reveals unique favourites” (but
nothing else about voters’ preferences).
As another example, it was shown in (10) that under RFC, whenever a voter has prefer-
ences conforming to expected utility theory (see below) with some utility function u, she has no
strategic incentive to specify different ratings than a properly rescaled version of u, and hence
RFC can be said to “reveal von-Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions” (but no preferences
that do not conform to expected utility theory). Still, RFC is not strategy-proof in the sense
that there always exist weakly dominant strategies, since in its other two ballot components,
a rational voter may want to name a proposed consensus option that depends on others’ pref-
erences, and may have incentives to name a different option as “fall-back” than her favourite.
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This shows that full preference revelation is related to but neither implied by nor stronger than
strategy-proofness.
FC reveals favourites but its consensus ballot component is strategic. NL and MaxParC also
reveal favourites in the sense that a voter has no incentive to not rank her favourite first or to rate
it below 100, but usually has an incentive to rate all other options strictly below 100. Neither of
them however reveal much more of a voter’s preferences.
AV and RV don’t reveal favourites since typically a rational voter has an incentive to approve
of (or rate at 100) some additional options. Still, in the case where voters have no information
about others’ preferences, AV and RV can be said to reveal something about a voter’s prefer-
ences, because in that case a rational expected utility theory voter would approve of (or rate at
100) all options she prefers to drawing an option uniformly at random (and would rate all other
options at 0), so that one can infer that she strictly prefers each approved to each disapproved
option.
Similarly, under NL, expected utility theory voters who use the zero-information heuristic
derived in the end of 2.3.2 also reveal their full preferences, but this heuristic might not be
a weakly dominant strategy under zero information, so rational voters may not use it. Under
MaxParC, the linear heuristic derived in 2.3.1 reveals the above-average part of a voter’s utility
function but is also typically not weakly dominant under zero information.
IRV and SC also do not reveal favourites. For IRV, consider three options and six voters
and assume voter 1 has preferences 1 : A > B > C and the others vote A > B, A, B > C, C > A,
C. Then if 1 votes sincerely, B is removed and a coin toss between A and C results. But if 1
votes B > A >C, A still gets probability 1/2 but now B gets 1/3 and C gets 1/6, which 1 strictly
prefers. For SC, consider three options and three voters and assume voter 1 has preferences
1 : A > B > C and the others vote B = C > A, C > A > B. Then 1 would want to vote A = B > C
or B > A >C to ensure a coin toss between B and C rather than voting sincerely A > B >C and
getting C for sure.
2.1.4 Proportional allocation of effective power
This criterion requires that in every situation (C,E) and for every option x ∈ C and group of
voters G ⊆ E, there must be a way of voting βG ∈ B(C)G for G so that for all ways of voting β−G ∈
B(C)E\G of the other voters, the winning probability of x is at least as large as G’s relative size:
M(βG,β−G)x ≥ |G|/|E|. A related criterion was discussed for the special case of “dichotomous
preferences” under the name “Core Fair Share” in (16).
Since all considered methods are neutral and anonymous, one can summarize the power dis-
tribution by drawing the maximal winning probability a group of size |G|/|E| = s can guarantee
any option x of their choice under the various methods, as is done in Fig. 5. For all consid-
ered deterministic methods, this “effective decision power” is basically a step function with the
value zero for s < 1/2 and one for s > 1/2 (blue line). Only for s = 1/2 the value depends
on the method’s detailed treatment of ties, which we do not discuss here. By contrast, for all
considered non-deterministic methods, it can easily be seen that any group G can guarantee x a
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Figure 5: Effective power of a voter group G as a function of group size, for majoritarian
deterministic methods PV, AV, RV, IRV, SC (blue), proportional nondeterministic methods RB,
FC, RFC, NL, MaxParC (green), and an example of a nonproportional nondeterministic method
(yellow).
probability at least |G|/|E| by simply bullet-voting for x, so effective decision power is simply
equal to s (green line), which we call proportional allocation of effective power.
Note that of course there are also non-deterministic neutral anonymous methods with dif-
ferent allocations of effective power. E.g., one could draw a sequence of plurality ballots at
random until one option was named twice (“first to get two”), giving a smooth but S-shaped
nonlinear power curve s2(3−2s).
For NL, it is the specific use of the logarithm that gives a linear power curve. Indeed, con-
sider a method that puts M(β) = argmax` S (`) for S (`) =
∑
i∈E f (ri(`)), some weakly increasing
and continuously differentiable function f , and ri(`) =
∑
x∈C `xβi(x). If the power curve is linear,
then whenever a group of voters G < {∅,E} bullet-votes for x and the other voters E \G bullet-
vote for y, we must have p := M(β)x = |G|/|E| =: s and q := M(β)y = 1− |G|/|E| = 1− s, hence
the first-order condition
0 = (∂p−∂q)S |p=s,q=1−s = s f ′(100s) + (1− s) f ′(100(1− s)) (33)
implies f ′(100s)∝ 1/s for all rational numbers s ∈ (0,1) and thus f (r)∝ logr for all real numbers
r ∈ (0,100).
2.1.5 Consensus supporting properties
In this section, we show that our two focus methods NL and MPC support both full and partial
consensus even with strategic voters. To do so, we show that the respective potential consensus
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options result both from sincere voting (see 2.3.1 for a discussion of sincere voting in MaxParC)
and in several forms of strategic equilibrium in archetypial decision situations.
Nash Lottery supports full consensus
Assumptions. We assume two equal-sized factions F1,F2 of m many voters each, and
three options A,B,D. Voters in F1 have von-Neumann–Morgenstern utility function u1(A,B,D) =
(1,0,u) and submit ratings r1(A,B,D) = (1,0,r), those in F2 have u2(A,B,D) = (0,1,v) and sub-
mit r2(A,B,D) = (0,1, s) with r, s ∈ (0,1) and 1/2 < u,v < 1, so that both factions prefer D to a
coin toss between A and B.
Resulting lottery and expected utilities. If A,B,D get probabilities p,q,1− p− q, the
resulting expected utilities are
U1 = p + (1− p−q)u, (34)
U2 = q + (1− p−q)v, (35)
and the Nash sum is
f = m log(p + (1− p−q)r) + m log(q + (1− p−q)s).
Because f is concave in both p and q, the unique pair p,q maximizing f can be found as follows.
Given q ∈ [0,1], f is maximized by that p ∈ [0,1−q] which is closest to the point p0(q) of zero
slope,
0 = ∂p f =
1− r
p + (1− p−q)r +
−s
q + (1− p−q)s , (36)
p0(q) =
(1−q)(1−2r)s + (1− r)q
2(1− r)s . (37)
Similarly, given p, f is maximized by that q ∈ [0,1− p] closest to
q0(p) =
(1− p)(1−2s)r + (1− s)p
2(1− s)r . (38)
If we introduce the notation [x]y0 = max(0,min(x,y)), the maximum of f is thus attained where
p =
[
(1−q)(1−2r)s + (1− r)q
2(1− r)s
]1−q
0
, (39)
q =
[
(1− p)(1−2s)r + (1− s)p
2(1− s)r
]1−p
0
. (40)
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Depending on r, s, the solution (p,q) found by the Nash Lottery method and resulting utilities
(U1,U2) are the following:
(p,q,U1,U2) =

(12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ) r + s < 1,
(1−2r,0,1−2r+u,v)
2−2r s ≤ 12 ,r ≥ 1− s,
(0,1−2s,u,1−2s+v)
2−2s r ≤ 12 , s ≥ 1− r,
(0,0,u,v) s,r ≥ 12 .
(41)
Outcome with sincere voters. Sincere voters put r = u > 1/2 and s = v < 1/2 and thus get
p = q = 0, i.e., the consensus option D wins for sure.
Strategic equilibria between factions. To analyse strategic incentives for the two fac-
tions, we treat F1,F2 as the players of a two-player game in which they simultaneously choose
r, s ∈ (0,1), and study the Nash equilibria (NE) of that game. Given some s, F1’s best responses
are the following: If s < min(12 ,1− u), each r < 1− s is a best response. If 1− u ≤ s < 12 , each
r ≥ 1− s is a best response. If s > 12 , only r = 1− s is a best response. If s = 12 ≥ u, each r ≤ 12 is
a best response. Finally, if s = 12 < u, only r =
1
2 is a best response.
Since we assume u,v > 12 , this results in the following sets of NE. Any combination r, s <
1
2
is a NE giving only U1 = U2 = 12 . Any combination (r,1− r) with r ∈ (1− v, 12 ) is a NE giving
(U1,U2) =
(1+u−2r,v)
2−2r . Any combination (1− s, s) with s ∈ (1− u, 12 ) is a NE giving (U1,U2) =
(u,1+v−2s)
2−2s . Finally, s = r =
1
2 is the “focal” NE giving (U1,U2) = (u,v) and the largest utility sum
U1 + U2 of all NE.
Summary. The above analysis shows that in this scenario, Nash Lottery supports full
consensus with both sincere voters (who would put r = u and s = v) and strategic voters (who
would put s = r = 12 ). We conjecture that similar calculations will show that the same holds with
more and unequally sized factions.
Nash Lottery supports partial consensus Assume that to the above we now add a third
faction F3 of size n−2m and a fourth option C, and utilities u3(A,B,D,C) = (0,0,0,1), u1(C) =
u2(C) = 0.
Strategic equilibria between factions. F3 has a dominant strategy to bullet-vote for D,
i.e., put r3(A,B,D,C) = (0,0,0,1), and F1, F2 have no reason not to put r1(C) = r2(C) = 0. If
we parameterize the probabilities of (A,B,D,C) as (p(1−w),q(1−w), (1− p−q)(1−w),w), the
Nash sum becomes
f = m log(p + (1− p−q)r) + m log(q + (1− p−q)s) + 2m log(1−w) + (n−2m) log(w),
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which is maximized by w = 1− 2m/n and the same values of (p,q) as above. Since F1, F2’s
utilities are proportional to the case above,
U1 = (1−w)(p + (1− p−q)u), (42)
U2 = (1−w)(q + (1− p−q)v), (43)
the strategic analysis is the same as before, so putting r = s = 12 is again the utility-maximizing
and focal equilibrium.
Outcome with sincere voters. Sincere voters in F1 and F2 still put r = u > 1/2, s = v <
1/2, βi(C) = 0, and those in F3 bullet-vote for C. They still get p = q = 0 and in addition w = 1−
2m/n, i.e., the partial consensus option D now gets probability 1−w = 2m/n = (|F1|+ |F2|)/|E|,
as required.
This shows that in this scenario, Nash Lottery also supports partial consensus. We conjecture
that the same holds with more and unequally sized factions, and with several partial consen-
susses between different sets of factions.
MaxParC supports full consensus Note that under MaxParC, one has never an incentive to
approve of a worst-liked option or to disapprove of one’s favourite. Since the following is not
restricted to voters with expected utility preferences, we don’t use von-Neumann–Morgenstern
utility functions ui here but rather state a voter’s preferences over lotteries of options `,`′ by
means of the binary relations `Pi `′ (strict preference for ` over `′), `Ri `′ (weak preference),
and `Ei `′ (indifference), only assuming that Ri is a quasi-ordering (not necessarily complete)
and that Pi and Ei are its antisymmetric and symmetric parts.
Assumptions. Assume m ≥ 2 factions F j with sizes N j ≥ 1, N = ∑mj=1 N j, with distinct
true favourites x j, and assume voters are indifferent about pairs of other factions’ favourites:
x j′Eix j′′ for all i ∈ F j if j′ , j , j′′. Let `b be the benchmark lottery of drawing a random
voter’s favourite: `b(x j) = N j/N. Assume there is just one more option y, and this is a potential
full consensus option: y Pi `b for all i.
Assume the MaxParC ballot profile β has βi(x j) = 100, βi(x j′) = 0, and 0 < βi(y) ≤ 100/N
for all j , j′ and i ∈ F j. Then each i ∈ F j approves of x j and y, hence all vote for y and y is the
sure winner.
Outcome with sincere voters. As discussed in 2.3.1, there is no unique way to vote “sin-
cerely” in MaxParC, hence we rather discuss the results of voters applying one of the heuristics
discussed there.
A voter applying the conservative satisficing heuristic rates their favourites x j at 100 and
the compromise y at 100(1−ui(`b)/ui(y)) > 0. Also with the informed satisficing heuristic, the
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linear heuristic, and the hyperbolic heuristic, voters rate y at > 0. So if all voters apply one of
these heuristics, y wins for sure.
Nash equilibrium. Since no i ∈ F j can make any i′ < F j vote for x j, the only way i could
only improve the result would be by making the vote of some i′ ∈ F j go to x j instead of to
y. But this is only possible by lowering βi(y) to zero (either certainly or with some positive
probability), which will make everyone disapprove of y and vote for their favourites, resulting
in `b. Since no mixture of `b with the sure-thing lottery `y is an improvement for i, β is a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Likewise, any group of voters G ⊆ F j from the same faction could only improve the result
for each of them by making the vote of some i′ ∈ F j go to x j. As above, this is only possible if
at least one i ∈G lowers βi(y) to zero, again resulting in `b, which is no improvement. Hence β
remains a Nash equilibrium when some group of voters from the same faction is considered to
act as one player; in particular, if each faction is considered one player (this could be called a
“factional Nash equilibrium”).
Still, as with other voting methods, it is easy to see that there are many other Nash equilibria
(e.g., the less efficient one where everyone bullet-votes, resulting in `b), so the criterion of
being a Nash equilibrium is not sufficiently discriminatory and stronger game-theoretic solution
concepts are called for.
Strong Nash equilibrium. Assume a proper subgroup G ⊂ E intersecting at least two
factions, let’s say it intersects the factions F1, . . . ,Fr. Assume the voters in G change their
ballots in some way that improves the result for them all. Assume some i ∈G stops approving
of y. Then the votes of all i′ < F1 + · · ·+ Fr will go to their favourites, hence, for j = 1 . . .r, at
least N j + 1 votes must go to x j for this to be an improvement for all in G, which is impossible
since there are only N1 + · · ·+ Nr votes left to distribute. Hence no i ∈ G stops approving of y,
and no x j gets approval by all voters, so y is still the sure winner, and there is no improvement
for G after all.
Finally, assume the whole electorate could improve the result for all. Then there would be
`′ , `b with `′Pi y for all i. Hence there would be `′′ , `b with `′′Pi y for all i and `′′(y) = 0.
But `′′ , `b implies there is j with `′′(x j) < `b(x j), so all i ∈ F j would have y Pi `b Pi `′′, a
contradiction.
This shows that β is a strong Nash equilibrium, i.e., no group whether small or large, unan-
imous or cross-faction, has an incentive to deviate from β.
Other methods. Under majoritarian methods, in particular PV, AV, RV, IRV, and SC, there
is usually no Nash equilibrium between the factions that would give y positive winning prob-
ability, simply because whenever N j > N/2 for some j, faction F j will enforce that x j wins.
Also, RB does not support full consensus since for all F j it is strictly dominant to vote for x j.
FC and RFC however do support full consensus, as shown in (10).
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With sincere voters, only AV and RV also support full consensus, while PV, IRV and SC
would still elect x j whenever N j > N/2.
MaxParC favours full over partial consensus
Assumptions. As a generalization of the above, assume now that there is an additional
option z, considered a potential partial consensus by the union H = F1 + · · ·+ Fh ⊂ E of some of
the factions, and considered equally bad by all others, so that `b/z Pi `b for all i ∈ H and z Ei x j
for all i < H + F j, where `b/z is the result of all i ∈ H voting for z and all others voting for their
favourites: `b/z(z) = |H|/N and `b/z(x j) = |F j|/N for all j > h.
Consider an extension of the above ballot profile β with 0 < βi(z) ≤ 100(1 + N − |H|)/N and
βi′(z) = 0 for all i ∈ H, i′ < H. Note that then all i ∈ F j approve of x j, all i ∈ H approve of z, and
all approve of y, hence again y is the sure winner.
Outcome with sincere voters. A voter applying one of the heuristic in 2.3.1 will rate y
at > 0 but will rate z at 0 if she is not a member of H. Hence if all voters apply some of these
heuristics, y will be strictly more approved than z and still win for sure.
Strong Nash equilibrium. If all i ∈ H consider full consensus still better than their po-
tential partial consensus, i.e., y Pi `b/z for all i ∈ H, then we will show that β is again a strong
Nash equilibrium, at least when all i ∈ H have von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility
functions ui(`) over lotteries. Assume some group G can improve the result to some lottery
`′ by modifying their ballots. If no i ∈ G stopped approving of y, y would remain the sure
winner, hence some i ∈ G stops approving of y and the votes of all i′ ∈ H −G go to z, while
those of i ∈ F j −G for j > h go to x j. As above, for all j with F j ∩G , ∅, at least N j + 1
votes must then go to x j for this to be an improvement for all i ∈ F j ∩G, hence less than
|H| votes are left that could go to either z or some of x1, . . . , xh. Those i ∈ F j ∩G, j ≤ h,
have Nui(`′) = vzui(z) + v jui(x j), where vz,v j are the votes going to z or x j, respectively, and
vz +
∑h
j=1 v j < |H|. Since Nui(y) > Nui(`b/z) = |H|ui(z) and Nui(y) > Nui(`b) = N jui(x j), we have
ui(y) < ui(`′) = [vzui(z)+v jui(x j)]/N < [vz/|H|+v j/N j]ui(y), i.e., v j > N j(1−vz/|H|) for all j ≤ h,
thus |H| − vz > ∑hj=1 v j > |H|(1− vz/|H|) = |H| − vz, a contradiction. Note that the same kind of
argument can be made if there are several partial potential consensus options z,z′,. . . , if each
pair of corresponding supporting groups H,H′ is either disjoint or one contains the other (so
that they form a hierarchy).
In other words, no group has an incentive to deviate from electing a good enough full con-
sensus, even if a whole hierarchy of narrower and broader partial consensus options is available.
MaxParC supports a single partial consensus
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Assumptions. Assume the same situation as in 2.1.5, but without the full consensus option
y, so that only the partial consensus option z remains besides the favourites x j. Then the same
ballot profile β, just with y removed, leads to the partial consensus result `(z) = |H|/N and
`(x j) = |F j|/N for j > h.
Outcome with sincere voters. If the voters from H apply the hyperbolic heuristic, they
rate z at 100(1− `(x j)/ui(z)) which is by assumption larger than 100(1− |H|/N), so they all end
up voting for z.
With the linear heuristic, however, they may rate z too low for getting their votes since
100(ui(z)− `(x j))/(1− `(x j)) might be smaller than 100(1− |H|/N).
Strong Nash equilibrium. We can show this β is again a strong Nash equilibrium when
voters have von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. Assume some i ∈G∩H stops approving of z.
Then, for each j with G∩F j , ∅, at least N j +1 votes must go to x j for this to be an improvement
for all in G, but for each j with G∩F j = ∅, all N j votes go to x j, a contradiction as above. So
no i ∈G∩H stops approving of z. If G∩H , ∅, some i ∈G−H must vote for z for those voters
to profit from the deviation. But then not enough votes are left in G−H to make all i ∈G−H
profit as well. So G∩H = ∅, but since E −H has no potential for even partial consensus, they
cannot improve over the benchmark lottery either. This completes the proof.
Other methods. Again, under majoritarian methods, in particular PV, AV, RV, IRV, and
SC, there is no Nash equilibrium between the factions that would give z positive winning prob-
ability if one of the factions is in a majority. Also, RB does not support partial consensus since
for all F j it is strictly dominant to vote for x j. FC and RFC also fail to support partial consensus:
If z wins because the fallback was not invoked, the voters in E \H can cause the fallback to be
invoked and have strict incentive to do so; if the fallback is invoked, no voter in any F j ⊂ H will
vote for z since they have then a strict incentive to vote for x j instead.
MaxParC supports disjoint partial consensuses If several disjoint groups of factions ex-
ist each of which has a potential partial consensus, the situation can get a little trickier, and
the canonical ballot profile might not be a strong Nash equilibrium but only a coalition-proof
equilibrium. We treat a simple special case first to demonstrate this.
Example. Assume N = 6, four factions of sizes N1 = N4 = 1 and N2 = N3 = 2 with favourites
x1 . . . x4, and two potential partial consensus options z,z′, with utilities as in the following table:
faction F1 F2 F3 F4
size 1 2 2 1
utility 100 x1 x2 x3 x4
75 z z z′ z′
0 rest rest rest rest
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A canonical ballot profile β that realizes both partial consensuses is given by this table:
faction F1 F2 F3 F4
willingness βi(x) 100 x1 x2 x3 x4
51 z z z′ z′
0 rest rest rest rest
Although this is a Nash equilibrium between the invididual voters and a Nash equilibrium be-
tween the four factions, it is not a strong Nash equilibrium since the two middle factions can
profit from approving their mutual favourites, i.e., deviating as follows:
faction F2 F3
willingness β′i(x) 100 x2 x3
51 z z′
35 x3 x2
0 rest rest
This will result in F2,F3 approving both x2, x3 so that these options get a higher approval (4)
than z,z′ (having 3), the votes of F2,F3 now go to x2, x3 in equal shares (due to the tiebreaker),
and those of F1,F4 still go to z,z′.
Still, the above deviation by F2,F3 is not coalition-proof since each of these two factions
has an incentive to betray the other by not performing the agreed deviation after all, i.e., by
deviating from the planned deviation. E.g., if F2 defects in this way, we have the profile
faction F1 F2 F3 F4
willingness β′′i (x) 100 x1 x2 x3 x4
51 z z z′ z′
35 x2
0 rest rest rest rest
which now makes F2’s and F3’s votes both go to x2, profiting F2 even more and leaving F3 with
strictly less than under β. Because of this risk of being betrayed by F2, F3 has few incentives to
agree with F2 to perform the original deviation β′.
Conjecture. More generally, we conjecture that under quite general conditions, there will
be at least a certain type of coalition-proof equilibrium (similar to (41)) which results in the
election of a broad consensus.
More specifically, consider the following type of situation: There are M ≥ 2 disjoint blocks
B1, . . . ,BM of voters, each block Bk having size Nk = |Bk| and consisting of mk ≥ 2 disjoint fac-
tions Fk1, . . . ,Fkmk , and we assume their sizes Nk j = |Fk j| are all at least 2M. Each faction Fk j has
a distinct favourite option xk j, each block Bk a potential partial consensus option yk. No other
options exist. Let `b(xk j) = Nk j/N define the benchmark lottery and `c(yk) = Nk/N define the par-
tial consensus lottery. Each voter i ∈ Fk j has a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with
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ui(xk j) = 1> ui(yk)>Nk j/Nk and ui(z) = 0 for all other options. The expected utility for i ∈ Fk j re-
sulting from some ballot profile β′ under MaxParC is thus ui(β′) = M(β′)(xk j)+ui(yk)M(β′)(yk),
where M(β′) is the resulting lottery.
Now consider the following “canonical” ballot profile β: For i ∈ Fk j, βi(xk j) = 100, 100(N−
Nk)/N < βiyk ≤ 100(1+ N−Nk)/N, and βi(z) = 0 for all other options. Note that under MaxParC
with this ballot profile, each i ∈ Fk j approves of xk j and yk, hence ends up voting for yk, so that
the resulting lottery is `c as desired.
Also assume that any group G of voters can secretly plan to deviate from β, leading to a
modified profile β′ with β′i = βi for all i <G, but that no member of G can be sure that the others
will actually perform the deviation; rather, any subgroup H ⊂ G can secretly plan a further
deviation β′′ from β′, with β′′i = β
′
i for all i < H.
Then we conjecture that with the above strategy profile β, if there is a group G with a
deviation β′ from β that strictly profits all members (i.e., ui(β′) > ui(β) for all i ∈G), there is a
subgroup H ⊂ G with a further deviation β′′ from β′ that strictly profits all its members (i.e.,
ui(β′′) > ui(β′) for all i ∈ H) and is strictly worse than β for at least one member of G (i.e., there
is i′ ∈G with ui′(β′′) < ui′(β)).
Summary We have shown in this section that NL and MaxParC both support full and par-
tial consensus in a number of archetypical decision situations, whereas all other eight studied
methods and all majoritarian methods do not.
2.2 Results of simulation experiments
We simulated 2M = 2,587,812 decision problems in total and stored the resulting welfare, ran-
domization, and satisfaction metrics of all ten methods and the preferences over all method
pairs.
To analyse voter behaviour during the interactive phase, we also stored (i) the share of
factional updates that led to a change in the faction’s ballots (metric moverate), (ii) the share
of trial-and-error updates that did not lead to a change in the voter’s ballot (metric keeprate),
and (ii) the share of problems in which the ballots after the interactive phase differed from before
that phase (metric interactivechanged).
Table 2 gives an overview of all metrics’ mean values.
In addition to univariate and bivariate statistics for all metrics, we also fitted an OLS gener-
alized linear regression model for each metric Y , separately for each preference model U, using
the following parameters as explanatory variables: dummy variables for the voting method (us-
ing RV as reference method); log-transformed numbers of voters (nvoters), options (noptions),
and polling rounds (npolls); shares of LCP (rshare_LCP), HCP (rshare_HCP), strategic
(sshare_S), trial-and-error (sshare_T), heuristic (sshare_H), and factional (sshare_F) vot-
ers; a dummy indicating whether the first option was a constructed compromise option (with_compromise);
and the parameters of the preference model (log(Bmr), Bmh, Bmiota or dim, log(omega),
rho). The regression analysis shows that the case number was large enough to distinguish the
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influences of all explanatory variables since almost all estimated coefficients were significantly
different from zero.
2.2.1 Social welfare
Absolute welfare metrics All six absolute welfare metrics (Wutil_initial, Wutil_final,
Wgini_initial, Wgini_final, Wegal_initial, Wegal_final) had considerably left-skewed
distributions across problems. When distinguishing by preference model (umodel), one can see
that this is due to the spatial preference models, and that their location depends strongly on the
preference model (Fig. 6).
In the block (BM) and uniform (unif) preference models, the majoritarian methods (PV,
AV, RV, IRV, SC) generated slightly larger utilitarian and slightly smaller egalitarian abso-
lute welfare than the proportional methods (RB, FC, RFC, NL, MPC), being roughly equiva-
lent on the intermediate Gini-Sen welfare metric. In the QA and LA models, the majoritarian
methods also outperformed the proportional ones in the Gini-Sen and egalitarian absolute wel-
fare metrics, most significantly in the QA model, less so in the LA model. In the GA model,
the differences between methods were still statistically significant (e.g., Tbl. 3) but negligible
in comparison to the overall dispersion of welfare across problems.
Throughout the regression models, more voter blocks (larger BMr), larger policy-space di-
mension (dim), and larger spatial voter heterogeneity (omega) decreased welfare, and so did
a larger number of voters except in the Wgini/GA case. More options and larger block size
heterogeneity (BMh) increased welfare. Larger individuality (Bmiota) increased utilitarian but
decreased Gini-Sen and egalitarian welfare. For the spatial option broadness parameter (rho)
and shares of non-EUT voters, there was no clear pattern. More pre-voting polling rounds had
a statistically significant but very small negative influence.
Larger shares of sincere, trial-and-error, and factional voters and lower shares of lazy voters
tended to increase welfare, the share of heuristic voters had no clear influence. Surprisingly,
adding a constructed compromise option only increased welfare in the spatial models though
not in the block and uniform models.
Relative welfare metrics Because of the skewed distributions of absolute welfare, we also
analysed the two versions of relative welfare metrics, Since the first of these was skewed in
the other direction in case of the nondeterministic methods and inequality-averse metrics, we
focus on the second, alternative version of relative welfare metrics here, which were much more
balanced (Fig. 7).
Interestingly, in the uniform preference model, alt_relWgini and alt_relWegal had a
particular trimodal distribution for the proportional methods, which performed similarly to the
deterministic methods in most cases, but much better in a somewhat smaller cluster of cases
and much worse in a still smaller cluster of cases.
Looking at the fairly inequality-averse Gini-Sen welfare metric in its “middle” version
alt_relWgini more closely in a regression analysis, we see that this metric typically in-
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Figure 6: Distribution of absolute social welfare across decision problems. Top: histograms,
kernel density estimators, and boxplots with means for three example metrics/methods. Bottom:
distribution of final absolute welfare by preference model and method.
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Figure 7: Distribution of relative social welfare across decision problems. Top: comparison of
the two versions of relative welfare with absolute welfare for one combination of metric and
method. Bottom: distribution of final alternative relative welfare metrics by preference model
and method.
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creased with the no. of options (except for the uniform preference model); it decreased with
the no. of polling rounds, the share of lazy voters; the addition of a constructed compromise op-
tion, the risk attitude scenario, and the spatial broadness parameter had no consistent influence
across preference models. In contrast to their influence on the absolute welfare metric Wgini,
a larger no. of voter blocks BMr, individuality BMiota, policy space dimension dim increased
alt_relWgini.
In addition, the grouped boxplots in Fig. 8 show some specific influences. A larger no.
of voters increased alt_relWgini considerably for the proportional, but not for the majori-
tarian methods. The behavioural type scenario influenced alt_relWgini under the Simple
Condorcet method much more than the other methods: interestingly, the all-sincere scenario
produced much less welfare than the all-lazy one. Larger spatial option broadness rho had
opposite effects for the majoritarian methods (increasing alt_relWgini) and the proportional
methods (decreasing alt_relWgini): when options had narrow appeal (or candidates a narrow
platform), proportional methods performed considerably better, with broadly appealing options
(or platforms) it was the other way around. Finally, alt_relWutil decreased with increas-
ing spatial voter heterogeneity omega more strongly for majoritarian methods, their clearest
advantage mostly restricted to narrow spatial voter distributions.
Frequency of best-performing methods If we focus on the more qualitative question of
which methods perform “best” how often, we can study the share of decision problems in which
the largest welfare was (i) only provided by one or more majoritarian methods (red in Fig. 9),
(ii) only provided by one or more proportional methods (green), or (iii) provided by at least one
method from both groups (yellow). In Fig. 9, this is shown for all three final welfare metrics
(Wutil, Wgini, Wegal), grouped by parameters that made a significant difference.
One can see that across all three welfare metrics, proportional methods were performing
best according to this statistic in the Gaussian allotment and uniform preference models, and
with fewer lazy voters.
W.r.t. Gini-Sen and egalitarian welfare, they performed best with larger no. of voter blocks,
more individuality, larger spatial voter heterogeneity, and lower spatial option broadness; w.r.t.
utilitarian welfare, this was the other way around.
“Cost of fairness” As a final indicator of the social welfare effects of using proportional
instead of majoritarian methods, we show the distribution of the above-defined cost of fairness
measure across all simulated decision problems in Fig. 10. It shows that, typically, the decrease
(if any) in average voter utility one gets by switching from the best majoritarian method (Range
Voting) to the best proportional (and thus “fair”) method in our study (MaxParC), was about an
order of magnitude smaller than the difference between the utilitarian and egalitarian absolute
social welfare resulting from using Range Voting (which can be seen as a natural measure of
absolute inequality in voters’ utility). The 2%-trimmed mean of this “relative cost of fairness”
was 0.08.
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Figure 8: Distribution of relative social welfare across decision problems. Specific influences
of no. of voters, behavioural type scenario, spatial option broadness, and spatial voter hetero-
geneity.
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umodel
BMr
BMiota
omega
rho
riskmodel
scenario
Wutil_final Wgini_final Wegal_final
Figure 9: Frequency of majoritarian and proportional methods being best according to final
utilitarian (left column), Gini-Sen (middle), and egalitarian (right) social welfare, by various
parameters (rows).
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Figure 10: Distribution of the “relative cost of fairness” across decision problems.
Summary Overall, one can conclude that proportional methods can well compete with ma-
joritarian ones regarding social welfare effects and that the welfare assessment depends strongly
on the choice of welfare metric used: the more inequality-averse the welfare metric, the more
it favours proportional methods. In addition, welfare effects of method choice depend strongly
on the distribution of voters’ preferences, which suggests that proportional methods may par-
ticularly well perform in situations with heterogeneous voters and when many options have a
comparatively narrow appeal.
Since proportional methods achieve this by randomization, and hence only over sequences
of several decisions (which is why we used ‘ex-ante’/long-run welfare metrics here), we need
to look next at the amount of randomization actually used.
2.2.2 Randomization
In “deterministic” methods, randomization is only used to resolve the odd tie, hence Shannon
entropy (and similarly Re´nyi entropy) is mostly zero, sometimes log2, and rarely larger, and
maximal option probability is mostly one, sometimes 1/2, and rarely smaller. Fig. 12 compares
this to the level of randomization in the nondeterministic methods used in this study. Under RB,
entropy is distributed in a left-skewed distribution with a peak at log noptions, leading to a
mixture distribution with mean around 1.3. Under FC, this distribution is further mixed with a
peak at 0 representing the cases where the full compromise was found. RFC was similar to FC
regarding randomization.
Under NL, this probability of finding a full compromise was almost twice as large; while it
still shows a mixture of left-skewed distributions with peaks at logk for some integer k, these k
are now generally smaller than for RB since the optimization of the Nash sum typically leaves
some options with zero probability. The mean entropy for NL is thus smaller, 1.05. For MPC,
this is even more pronounced, with two clear peaks at 0 and log2 and mean entropy initially 0.9.
For MPC, the interactive phase changed entropy the most, bringing it down to 0.8 on average.
For RB and FC, the 25% quantile [and mean] of the largest option probability were only at
around 0.3 [0.43], for NL is was at around 0.35 [0.53], and for MPC initially around 0.45 [0.6]
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and finally (after the interactive phase) around 0.5 [0.65].
Regression analysis reveals that Shannon entropy increases (and max. probability decreases)
with the no. of options, no. of voters (slightly), no. of voter blocks, and share of lazy voters (con-
siderably). Adding a constructed compromise option decreased entropy (and increased max.
probability) even if it had no clear welfare effects. Surprisingly, the share of non-expected-
utility, risk- (and hence randomization-) averse voters had no clear effect on the level of ran-
domization, and neither had the no. of pre-voting polls.
Fig. 13 shows some further parameter influences on individual methods’ level of random-
ization. With more options and more trial-and-error voters, MPC’s advantage becomes more
pronounced, while NL randomizes less if all voters are sincere or are factionally strategic, the
latter reflecting the fact that the factional strategy in NL was implemented as an optimization
problem in our simulations which however might be hard to solve in reality.
In the next subsection we will see whether strategizing pays off and whether it gives a
relative advantage.
2.2.3 Satisfaction
In order to see whether and when different behavioural types of voters have advantages, we
study the distribution of the average satisfaction of all voters of a certain type across our sim-
ulations. Fig. 14 shows that typical shape of these distributions depends very much on the
method, but is almost identical for the two polar behavioural types of lazy voters and faction-
ally strategic voters (and also for the other three types). In other words, voting strategically does
not so much give a comparative advantage to the strategic voters over the lazy ones, but rather
increases overall welfare (as seen above).
As can be seen in Fig. 11, the majoritarian methods fare somewhat better regarding average
voter satisfaction with mean values around 0.66 compared to MPC’s mean of around 0.61,
again quite much depending on the preference model. As can be expected, for the proportional
methods the risk-averse non-EUT voters were less satisfied.
2.2.4 Preferences over methods
If voters were to decide between the ten voting methods and would use for this “meta-decision”
a pairwise comparison method such as Simple Condorcet or any other majoritarian method,
which voting method would win?
If one assumes that voters are purely consequentialist and judge a method only by its gener-
ated utility, the surprising answer seems to be that they would then end up with Instant-Runoff
Voting. As table 2 shows, IRV is the Condorcet Winner of this meta-decision since it would win
a pairwise decision against all other nine methods.16
16Which method would win if the meta-decision was made using a proportional method, we can only speculate
here since our current results do not provide us a way to predict this.
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Figure 11: Distribution of the final average satisfaction of heuristic voters across decision prob-
lems, by method.
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However, in an actual decision about a future voting method, people would however proba-
bly also have non-consequentialist preference components related to fairness, consistency, and
other criteria such as those discussed in section 2.1.
2.2.5 Further conclusions
Our experiments indicate that assessments via agent-based simulations involving individual
preferences will usually depend very much on the particular assumptions about voters’ prefer-
ence distributions, whether from a spatial or other model (or “culture”), and on the particular
functional forms (e.g., linear, quadratic, or Gaussian) and parameter values used in these mod-
els.
They also seem to suggest that using an interactive phase only rarely has any considerable
effect on the most important metrics, with the decrease in randomization under MaxParC being
an exception. This might however be due to our very restricted assumptions on what agents can
do during the interactive phase. Future work, whether empirical or numerical, should therefore
consider the possibilities of information gathering, communication and other forms of social
dynamics during the interactive phase.
To this end, we are currently developing a social app that offers an interactive version of
MaxParC for making everyday group decisions, which we plan to use in empirical studies to
assess the real-world performance and social dynamics of nondeterministic proportional con-
sensus decision making methods.
2.3 Derivation of heuristics and strategies
2.3.1 Sincere voting under MaxParC
Since the MaxParC ballot explicitly asks for a quantity (the level “willingness” to approve of an
option) whose meaning ultimately depends on ones beliefs about the other voters’ preferences,
voting under MaxParC always incorporates some form of “strategic” thinking in some sense, so
it is in a way pointless to ask what “the” sincere way of filling in a MaxParC ballot is. Rather,
one may apply any of a number of different heuristics that all lead to a sincere ballot in the sense
that more-preferred options are assigned higher willingness values.
Conservative satisficing heuristic. This sincere voting heuristic is based on the idea to assign
to any option y a willingness b(y) just small enough to guarantee that if I end up approving of y
and all who don’t approve of y approve of their favourite only, the resulting lottery will not be
worse than the benchmark lottery ` that would result if all approve of their favourite only.
To find this willingness value b(y), a EU-type voter would proceed as follows. Assume
`(x) > 0 for all x ∈ C (otherwise ignore those x for which `(x) = 0 in the following). Sort the
options into an ordering x1, x2, . . . by descending utility, so that ui(x1) > ui(x2) > . . . > ui(xk) and
x1 = fi is the favourite of i. For all a = 0 . . .k, let Fa =
∑k
c=a+1 `(xc) and Ua =
∑k
c=a+1 `(xc)ui(xc),
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noting that 1− `( fi) = F1 > . . . > Fk = 0, U0 = ui(`) and Uk = 0. For each β ∈ [0,1− `( fi)], let
a(β) the smallest a with Fa ≤ β, noting that a(0) = k and a(1− `( fi)) = 1. For each y ∈ C \ { fi}
with ui(y) ≥ ui(`), let
Vy(β) = (1−β)ui(y) + Ua(β) + (β−Fa(β))ui(xa(β)), (44)
noting that Vy(0) = ui(y) ≥ ui(`) and Vy(1− `( fi)) = ui(`)− `( fi)(ui( fi)− ui(y)) < ui(`). Vy(β) is
the evaluation of the lottery that results if the βN voters whose favourites I like least (this is the
“conservative” aspect of the heuristic) approve of their favourite only while the rest (including
me) approve also of y so that y will win with probability 1− β while the rest of the winning
probability goes to options I rather don’t like. The “satisficing” aspect of the heuristic is to
be satisfied if this evaluation is not worse than that of the benchmark lottery. Hence one lets
b(y) = 100β for the largest β with Vy(β) ≥ ui(`), so that 0 ≤ b(y) < 100(1− `( fi)), and completes
the ballot by putting b( fi) = 100 and b(y) = 0 for all y ∈C with ui(y) < ui(`).
LCP-type voters may use the same formula based on the probability weights w j instead of
the actual probabilities `(x j).
Also for HCP-type voters, one can easily derive a similar formula.
Note that this heuristic indeed produces a sincere ballot since ui(y′) > ui(y) will imply b(y) >
b(y′). If one has to expect that a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of all voters is lazy, one would adjust b(y) to
b(y) = 100(α+ (1−α)β) if β > 0.
Informed satisficing heuristic. If more information about the other voters’ preferences is
available or can be estimated, one may rather want to apply this heuristic in which i assumes
that if a fraction of voters j will eventually approve of some option y, it will be those j with the
largest relative utility ρ j(y) :=
u j(y)−u j(`)
u j( f j)−u j(`) . Hence let us assume i has beliefs regarding the distri-
bution of ρ j(y) inside each faction Fx and hence can sort the voters into an ordering j1, . . . , jN
by descending ρ j(y), so that ρ j1(y) > . . . > ρ jN (y) and so that she knows f ja for all a. If the first
n ≤ N voters in this ordering rather assign their winning probability to y than to f ja , i’s utility
becomes
Vy(n) = (nui(y) +
N∑
a=n+1
ui( f ja))/N. (45)
Now if i is satisfied if this is no smaller than ui(`), she would seek the smallest n with ρ jn(y) ≤
ρi(y) and Vy(n′) ≥ ui(`) for all n′ > n and put b(y) = 100(1− n/N), or, if there is no such n, put
b(y) = 0. Note that also this heuristic has b(y) > 0 iff ui(y) ≥ ui(`) (since then n < N).
However, this heuristic may produce insincere ballots in which b(y′) < b(y) despite ui(y′) >
ui(y) since the voter ordering used for b(y′) may be completely different than the one used for
b(y). Still, one can argue that in many situations, the ballot will be approximately sincere.
This is because often (i) ρ jn(y) ≤ ρi(y) will imply Vy(n′) ≥ ui(`) for all n′ > n, and hence b(y) ≈
100(1− |{ j : ρ j(y) ≥ ρi(y)}|), and (ii) the distribution of ρ j(y) in the electorate will be similar for
all relevant options y, so that b(y) is approximately monotonic in ρi(y). In a spatial model with
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concave utilities ui(y) = f (||ηi− ξy||) (such as the LH and QH models) and smoothly and widely
distributed voter and option positions, i will indeed prefer y to a lottery of favourites of those
voters j with ρ j(y) ≥ ρ for any ρ since those voters are distributed approximately uniformly and
symmetrically around ηy, so the average distance from ηi to their favourites is at least ||ηi− ξy||,
translating into an expected utility from the lottery that is below ui(y) since f is concave. More
particularly, both in the 1-dimensional LH and the 2-dimensional QH model, the number of
voters j with ρ j(y) ≥ ρi(y) scales roughly linearly with 1− ρi(y), hence b(y) will scale roughly
linearly with ρi(y), whereas in a higher-dimensional model, b(y) will become a concave function
of ρi(y).
Our next two heuristics mimic this linear or concave behaviour to some extent with much
simpler formulae.
Linear heuristic. A much simpler heuristic is the one we assume in our simulations, where
b(y) = 100
(
α+ (1−α) ui(y)−ui(`)maxx∈C ui(x)−ui(`)
)
for all y ∈C with ui(y) ≥ ui(`), i.e., one assigns a willing-
ness of 0 to options worse than the benchmark, 100 to one’s favourite, and interpolates linearly
between 100α and 100 based on the options’ utilities, where α ∈ [0,1] is the expected share of
lazy voters in the electorate.
One motivation for this heuristic is that under certain assumptions, it can be interpreted as an
approximation of the conservative satisficing heuristic. Assume the number of options is large,
their utilities ui(y) for i are distributed uniformly, say (without loss of generality) between 0 and
ui( fi) = 1, and their benchmark winning probabilities `(y) are not correlated to i’s evaluations
ui(y). Then ui(`) ≈ 1/2, Fa and a(β) decrease approximately linearly in a or β, respectively,
Ua(β) ≈ β2/2, and β− Fa(β) is small. Hence Vy(β) ≈ (1− β)ui(y) + β2/2, which equals ui(`) for
β ≈ 2ui(y)−1, hence b(y) ≈ 100
(
α+ (1−α) ui(y)−ui(`)maxx∈C ui(x)−ui(`)
)
for all y with ui(y) ≥ ui(`). The same
derivation can be made under the weaker assumption that only those options y with ui(y) ≥ ui(`)
are numerous, have uniformly distributed ui(y) and have `(y) uncorrelated to ui(y). These as-
sumptions are, e.g., approximately fulfilled if k is large and utility follows the LH model. If,
instead, utility depends more concavely on distance, as in the QH model, the linear heuristic will
tend to produce larger willingness values than the conservative satisficing heuristic, hence will
produce more compromise outcomes which however may sometimes be worse than the bench-
mark lottery for some voters. On the contrary, if utility depends more convexly on distance,
as in the tails of the GH model, the linear heuristic will tend to produce smaller willingness
values than the conservative satisficing heuristic, hence may sometimes not produce a partial
consensus when there is a potential one.
Hyperbolic heuristic. A little less simple is the heuristic that puts b( fi) = 100, b(y) = 0 for all
y with ui(y) < ui(`), and b(y) = 100(1− ui(`)−min j ui( f j)ui(y)−min j ui( f j) ) for all other y, which has a hyperbolical
rather than a linear dependency on ui(y), growing fast for ui(y) slightly above ui(`) and much
slower for ui(y) approaching ui( fi).
Also this formula can be derived as an approximation of the conservative satisficing heuris-
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tic, under different assumptions on the distribution of utility. Assume that i considers all other
options than fi that occur as favourites of any voter as approximately equally bad, so that we
can assume ui( fi) = 1 and ui( f j) ≈ 0 for all j with f j , fi. Then ui(`) ≈ `( fi), Vy(β) ≈ (1−β)ui(y),
hence b(y) ≈ 100(1− ui(`)ui(y) ) ≈ 100(1−
ui(`)−min j ui( f j)
ui(y)−min j ui( f j) ). Since these assumptions on utility are even
more extremely “convex” than in the GA model, the hyperbolic heuristic may be a better choice
in Gaussian utility situations than the linear heuristic.
2.3.2 Heuristic Nash Lottery strategy
Assume N  1 and C = {1, . . . ,k}, put m = k− 1, e = (1, . . . ,1) ∈ Rm, p = (`1, . . . , `m), v = u1k,
w = (u11−v, . . . ,u1m−v). We focus on voter 1’s choice of ratings r1∗ = βi and consider s = r1k ≥ 0,
t = (r11− s, . . . ,r1m− s) with tx ≥−s the control variables, all vectors being column vectors. Then
the Nash sum (= log of Nash lottery target function) is
f (p|s, t) = g(p|s, t) + h(p) (46)
with
g(p|s, t) = log(s + p>t),h(p) =
∑
i
log(rik +
∑
x
pxrix), (47)
where summation over i means i = 2 . . .N (likewise for j) and summation over x means x =
1 . . .m (likewise for y,z).
Since N  1, we can approximate
f (p|s, t) = g(q|s, t) + d>G(s, t) + h(q) + d>Hd/2, (48)
where
q = argmax
p
h(p), (49)
d = p−q, (50)
G(s, t)x = ∂pxg(p|s, t)|p=q =
t
s + q>t
= γ(s, t)t, (51)
Hxy = ∂px∂pyh(p)|p=q =
∑
i
∂px
riy
rik +
∑
z pzriz
= −
∑
i
rixriy
(rik +
∑
z pzriz)2
(52)
with
γ(s, t) =
1
s + q>t
> 0, (53)
∂sγ(s, t) = − 1(s + q>t)2 = −γ(s, t)
2 < 0, (54)
∇tγ(s, t) = − q(s + q>t)2 = −γ(s, t)
2q. (55)
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Assume that H is nonsingular with
I = H−1, (56)
and note that H, I are symmetric and negative semidefinite. Assume that qx > 0 for all x and
t , 0, so that s + q>t > 0 and γ(s, t) <∞.
The Nash lottery p∗(s, t) is that p ∈ [0,1]m with e>p ≤ 1 which maximizes f (p|s, t). Assume
this is an interior solution (e.g., since there is at least one bullet voter for each option), then the
first-order condition is
0 = ∇p f (p|s, t) = ∇d(d>G(s, t) + d>Hd/2) = G(s, t) + Hd, (57)
hence
d∗(s, t) = −IG(s, t) = −γ(s, t)It, (58)
∂sd∗(s, t) = γ(s, t)2It, (59)
∇td∗(s, t)> = γ(s, t)2qt>I−γ(s, t)I. (60)
Voter 1’s expected utility is then
U(s, t) = v + p∗(s, t)>w = v + q>w + d∗(s, t)>w = v + q>w−γ(s, t)t>Iw. (61)
If she considers abstaining (which is equivalent to putting t ≡ 0 and an arbitrary s > 0, w.l.o.g.
s = 1) and wonders what small change in ratings ∆r would improve her utility most, she would
calculate
∂r1xU(s, t)|t≡0 = −∂tx(γ(s, t)t>Iw)|t≡0 = −(∂tx t>|t≡0)Iw = −(Iw)x, (62)
∂r1kU(s, t)|t≡0 = −(∂s−
∑
x
∂tx)(γ(s, t)t
>Iw)|t≡0 =
∑
x
(Iw)x. (63)
Not knowing H and hence I, voter 1 might use the following heuristic to estimate an ap-
proximate H from the latest favourite polling data, simply assuming every other voter j > 1 is
lazy and submits a bullet vote r jx = 1 for their favourite option x, putting all others to r jy = 0.
In that case, assuming f p(x) > 0 for all x,
Hxy ≈ N2
(
1/ f p(k) +δxy/ f p(x)
)
(64)
where δxy = 1 iff x = y, else δxy = 0. Hence H is a matrix filled with equal positive entries plus
some positive diagonal. Its inverse then has
Ixx ≈ ζ f p(x) (N − f p(x)) (65)
Ixy ≈ −ζ f p(x) f p(y) (66)
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for some ζ > 0 and all x , y. This would imply that voter 1’s utility grows fastest in the direction
∆r1 with
∆r1x = −(Iw)x ≈ ζ f p(x)
Nwx−∑
y
f p(y)wy
 = ζN f p(x)(u1x−υ), (67)
∆r1k =
∑
x
(Iw)x ≈ ζN
∑
x
f p(x) (υ−u1x) = ζN f p(k)(u1k −υ), (68)
where υ =
∑k
x=1 u1x f
p(x)/N is voter 1’s expected utility of the benchmark lottery based on the
latest favourite polling data. A natural heuristic is then that voter 1 moves her ratings from
r1x ≡ r1k = 1 as much in the above direction as is possible without any rating getting negative,
i.e., putting
r1x = 1 +ρ f p(x)(u1x−υ) ≥ 0 (69)
for all x = 1 . . .k, where
ρ = 1/ f p(y)(υ−u1y) > 0, (70)
y = arg
k
min
x=1
f p(x)(u1x−υ), (71)
so that r1y = 0. In the special case where f p(x) ≡ N/k (e.g. before the first poll), we get y =
argminkx=1 u1x, ρ = k/N(υ− u1y), and r1x =
u1x−minkz=1 u1z
υ−minkz=1 u1z
∝ u1x −minkz=1 u1z, i.e., voter 1 would
then vote sincerely. If, however, some options appear to have much higher chances than others,
she would exaggerate her stated preferences regarding those options that appear to have higher
chances (high f p(x)) while playing down her stated preferences regarding those options that
appear to have lower chances, which can result in rating some promising well-liked compromise
option higher than her favourite if the latter has low chances, or rating some lurking less-liked
compromise option lower than a very improbable least-liked option.
2.3.3 Factional unanimous best response in IRV
We show that w.l.o.g., one can restrict the analysis on the described set A of ballots. First,
assume some ballot ranks some option y which however gets eliminated before all higher-ranked
options are eliminated. Then submitting a shorter ballot with y left out instead leads to the exact
same tally process. Second, assume y is ranked but gets eliminated at the same point as when
submitting the shorter ballot with y left out. Then submitting the shorter ballot also leads to the
exact same tally process. Hence we can restrict our focus on ballots ranking only options that
survive the elimination process strictly longer than when not ranked, and don’t get eliminated
before any higher-ranked option. For any ballot b = (x1, x2, . . . , x`) ∈ A, let a(b) ∈ {0,1, . . . ,k−1}
be the number of options eliminated strictly before x` when submitting b, and assume that also
b′ = (x1, x2, . . . , x`,y) ∈ A. Note that if submitting b, y is eliminated after at least a(b) + 1 many
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options, but is not the winner (otherwise b′ < A), hence there are at most k − a(b)− 2 many
different y ∈ C such that (x1, x2, . . . , x`,y) ∈ A. Thus the number a′(b,y) of options eliminated
strictly before y when submitting b (not b′!) is one of the numbers in {a(b) + 1, . . . ,k−2} and is
different for all y for which (x1, x2, . . . , x`,y) ∈ A. If submitting b′, y must survive longer than
when submitting b, hence
a(b′) > a′(b,y) ≥ a(b) + 1 > a′((x1, x2, . . . , x`−1), x`) + 1, (72)
i.e., a(b′) ≥ a(b)+2. This implies that any ballot b = (x1, x2, . . . , x`) ∈ A can be uniquely encoded
via a sequence of integers (a′(∅, x1), a′((x1), x2), a′((x1, x2), x3), . . . , a′((x1, x2, . . . , x`−1), x`)) that
fulfils
a′((x1, . . . ), xi) + 1 < a′((x1, . . . ), xi+1 (73)
for all i. There are less than 2k such sequences in 0, . . . ,k−1, hence |A| ≤ 2k.
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behavioural types scenario
type lazy middle strategic all-L all-S all-T all-H all-F
L (lazy) 1/3 1/6 1/20 1 0 0 0 0
S (sincere) 1/3 1/6 1/20 0 1 0 0 0
T (trial-and-error) 1/9 1/6 1/5 0 0 1 0 0
H (heuristic) 1/9 1/6 1/5 0 0 0 1 0
F (factional) 1/9 1/3 1/2 0 0 0 0 1
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PV AV RV IRV SC RB FC RFC NL MPC
anonymous yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
neutral yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pareto-efficient w.r.t. stated preferences yes yes yes yes yes yes no no yes yes
strongly mono-raise monotonic yes yes yes no yes yes no no no yes
weakly mono-raise monotonic yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes ? yes
weakly mono-raise-abstention mon. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
independent from Pareto-dominated alternatives partial full full full full partial no no full full
independent from losing options no full full no no partial no no full full
independent from exact clones no yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
stronger forms of clone-proofness no yes yes no yes yes no ? ? ?
strategy-freeness no no no no no yes no no no no
reveals preferences no some some no no fav. fav. utility fav. fav.
allocates power proportionally no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
supports full consensus with sincere voters no yes yes no no no yes yes yes yes
supports full consensus with strategic voters no no no no no no yes yes yes yes
supports partial consensus with strategic voters no no no no no no no no yes yes
PV AV RV IRV SC RB FC RFC NL MPC
moverate 0.15 0.178 0.193 0.0257 0.0768 0 0.00145 0.013 0.488 0.327
keeprate 0.289 0.315 0.248 0.293 0.356 0 0.208 0.211 0.198 0.282
interactivechanged 0.0697 0.192 0.113 0.0934 0.307 0 0.403 0.423 0.62 0.482
Eshannon_initial 0.0344 0.0703 0.0173 0 0.0795 1.32 1.25 1.23 1.06 0.914
Eshannon_final 0.0211 0.0434 0.0119 0 0.0515 1.32 1.28 1.26 1.05 0.809
Erenyi2_initial 0.0344 0.0703 0.0173 0 0.0795 1.21 1.14 1.12 0.958 0.792
Erenyi2_final 0.0211 0.0434 0.0119 0 0.0515 1.21 1.18 1.15 0.961 0.689
maxprob_initial 0.976 0.954 0.988 1 0.949 0.423 0.456 0.466 0.539 0.602
maxprob_final 0.985 0.971 0.992 1 0.966 0.423 0.448 0.46 0.532 0.649
pcompromise_initial 0.0883 0.308 0.236 0.171 0.309 0.0833 0.147 0.186 0.214 0.257
pcompromise_final 0.0921 0.27 0.234 0.192 0.431 0.0833 0.156 0.193 0.221 0.278
Wutil_initial -2.3 -2.36 -2.27 -2.25 -4.06 -4.17 -3.8 -3.7 -4.04 -2.97
Wutil_final -2.29 -2.28 -2.26 -2.24 -3.22 -4.17 -3.78 -3.62 -3.58 -2.93
Wgini_initial -3.18 -3.26 -3.13 -3.09 -5.76 -5.86 -5.3 -5.15 -5.66 -4.07
Wgini_final -3.17 -3.14 -3.11 -3.09 -4.51 -5.86 -5.27 -5.03 -4.98 -4.02
Wegal_initial -8.43 -8.77 -8.32 -8.15 -16.8 -18.6 -16.5 -15.9 -17.1 -11.8
Wegal_final -8.4 -8.33 -8.24 -8.13 -12.7 -18.6 -16.3 -15.4 -14.8 -11.6
relWutil_initial 0.813 0.857 0.87 0.857 0.681 0.637 0.653 0.657 0.694 0.723
relWutil_final 0.813 0.849 0.861 0.851 0.747 0.637 0.651 0.657 0.69 0.729
relWgini_initial 0.857 0.968 0.931 0.896 0.765 2.1e+20 2.1e+20 2.1e+20 2.1e+20 2.1e+20
relWgini_final 0.851 0.947 0.934 0.908 0.885 2.1e+20 2.1e+20 2.1e+20 2.1e+20 2.1e+20
relWegal_initial 1.93e+20 3.6e+26 1.91e+20 1.91e+20 1.91e+20 2.2e+67 2.2e+67 2.2e+67 2.2e+67 2.21e+67
relWegal_final 1.92e+20 1.35e+59 1.91e+20 1.91e+20 1.31e+21 2.2e+67 2.2e+67 2.2e+67 2.2e+67 2.21e+67
alt_relWutil_initial 0.85 0.886 0.893 0.884 0.739 0.754 0.764 0.767 0.792 0.813
alt_relWutil_final 0.849 0.879 0.886 0.879 0.796 0.754 0.762 0.767 0.788 0.814
alt_relWgini_initial 0.881 0.948 0.937 0.915 0.782 0.998 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02
alt_relWgini_final 0.877 0.934 0.933 0.917 0.861 0.998 1 1.01 1.01 1.01
alt_relWegal_initial 0.701 0.781 0.749 0.717 0.68 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.07
alt_relWegal_final 0.694 0.764 0.75 0.726 0.744 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.04
avgsatisfaction_initial_F 0.664 0.684 0.684 0.68 0.616 0.564 0.568 0.57 0.588 0.614
avgsatisfaction_final_F 0.665 0.68 0.682 0.678 0.649 0.564 0.569 0.575 0.604 0.618
avgsatisfaction_initial_H 0.664 0.684 0.684 0.679 0.615 0.564 0.568 0.57 0.588 0.614
avgsatisfaction_final_H 0.664 0.68 0.681 0.677 0.639 0.564 0.566 0.57 0.579 0.618
avgsatisfaction_initial_L 0.657 0.672 0.672 0.667 0.581 0.564 0.564 0.565 0.6 0.597
avgsatisfaction_final_L 0.657 0.669 0.67 0.666 0.606 0.564 0.563 0.564 0.589 0.601
avgsatisfaction_initial_S 0.657 0.683 0.684 0.677 0.577 0.564 0.574 0.574 0.617 0.608
avgsatisfaction_final_S 0.658 0.68 0.681 0.676 0.602 0.564 0.572 0.574 0.608 0.613
avgsatisfaction_initial_T 0.658 0.68 0.684 0.678 0.578 0.564 0.573 0.574 0.619 0.609
avgsatisfaction_final_T 0.661 0.676 0.682 0.677 0.65 0.564 0.567 0.569 0.594 0.616
pctprefer_PV_over — 18 15.4 13.3 34.3 65.4 63.4 63.1 61.2 58.7
pctprefer_AV_over 19.2 — 9.47 12.5 33.5 69.2 65.2 65.2 62.8 59.1
pctprefer_RV_over 17.3 10.4 — 10.8 33.3 69.1 65.3 65.2 63.2 59.4
pctprefer_IRV_over 15.8 14.1 11.6 — 32.8 68 65.1 64.9 63.1 60.1
pctprefer_SC_over 26.8 24.2 23.5 22.8 — 61.7 59.3 58.9 57 53.5
pctprefer_RB_over 34.4 30.6 30.7 31.9 38.1 — 20.6 20.4 37.4 26.9
pctprefer_FC_over 35.1 31.1 31.1 32.4 38.8 24.3 — 21.4 39.2 27.8
pctprefer_RFC_over 35.5 31.4 31.4 32.7 39.2 28.5 25.8 — 40 28.9
pctprefer_NL_over 36.9 34 33.4 34.2 41 62.4 59.5 58.7 — 42.3
pctprefer_MPC_over 38.4 34.1 34.4 35.5 42.4 63.6 59.5 58.7 56.4 —
PV AV RV IRV SC RB FC RFC NL MPC
Table 2: Level of compliance with voting method consistency criteria, and average performance
metrics from agent-based simulations.
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OLS Regression Results
==============================================================================
Dep. Variable: Wgini_final R-squared: 0.661
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.661
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 2.663e+05
Date: Sat, 04 Apr 2020 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 15:34:58 Log-Likelihood: 1.0244e+07
No. Observations: 5124153 AIC: -2.049e+07
Df Residuals: 5124130 BIC: -2.049e+07
Df Model: 22
Covariance Type: HC1
===================================================================================
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept 0.1581 0.000 1223.248 0.000 0.158 0.158
PV -0.0018 6.48e-05 -27.023 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
AV 5.993e-05 6.55e-05 0.916 0.360 -6.84e-05 0.000
IRV -0.0002 6.53e-05 -3.193 0.001 -0.000 -8.05e-05
SC -0.0030 6.58e-05 -44.931 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
RB 0.0019 6.47e-05 29.673 0.000 0.002 0.002
FC 0.0018 6.47e-05 28.243 0.000 0.002 0.002
RFC 0.0018 6.47e-05 28.405 0.000 0.002 0.002
NL 0.0017 6.5e-05 26.489 0.000 0.002 0.002
MPC 0.0014 6.52e-05 22.143 0.000 0.001 0.002
log(nvoters) 0.0003 1.06e-05 25.800 0.000 0.000 0.000
log(noptions) 0.0046 4.01e-05 115.265 0.000 0.005 0.005
with_compromise 0.0004 2.9e-05 12.443 0.000 0.000 0.000
rshare_LCP 0.0004 4.05e-05 10.453 0.000 0.000 0.001
rshare_HCP 0.0009 4.08e-05 22.671 0.000 0.001 0.001
log(npolls) 6.738e-05 1.87e-05 3.607 0.000 3.08e-05 0.000
sshare_S 0.0005 5.79e-05 9.036 0.000 0.000 0.001
sshare_T 0.0007 5.69e-05 13.150 0.000 0.001 0.001
sshare_H 0.0012 5.68e-05 20.744 0.000 0.001 0.001
sshare_F 0.0013 5.42e-05 23.297 0.000 0.001 0.001
dim -0.0465 1.95e-05 -2384.367 0.000 -0.047 -0.046
log(omega) -0.0447 3.11e-05 -1437.194 0.000 -0.045 -0.045
rho -0.0018 3.89e-05 -46.644 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
==============================================================================
Omnibus: 909575.095 Durbin-Watson: 1.060
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 1549242.812
Skew: 1.174 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 4.319 Cond. No. 63.3
==============================================================================
Table 3: Generalized linear model for Gini-Sen absolute social welfare in the GA preference
model.
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Figure 12: Initial and final distribution of Shannon entropy (top) and maximal option probability (bottom) across decision
problems for selected methods.
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noptions with_compromise umodel BMr scenario
Figure 13: Statistics for final Shannon entropy (top) and maximal option probability (bottom) across decision problems for
all methods, grouped by parameters with considerable influence.
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Figure 14: Distribution of final average satisfaction of lazy (top) and factionally strategic (bottom) voters across decision
problems for selected methods.
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